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CHAPTER I

•

INTRODUCTION
In a discussion of any doctrine so radical in a metaphysics
and so far-reaching in its ontological implications as that of
predicamental relations, it is necessary at the outset to determine once and for all onets precise purpose and scope, method
and attack, and the limits one places on the treatment of the
subject.
A subject so vast could well become a mere superficial
scaling of texts and shuffling of cliches torn from the pages of
secondary sources and forced into some kind of extrinsic unity
by reading into the opinions and conclusions of a philosopher
the point one would like to find there and to establish.

Such

a work is foreign to everything that is philosophical and historical.
In this thesis we shall treat of relations, but not all reM
lations.

We shall try to focus on those relations which are

known'as "predicamental relations."

But even this is too broad.

We shall try to interpret and rethink the fundamental problems
arising from predicamental relations precisely as these relation
were conceived and understood by Francis Suarez, the theologianphilosopher, whom tradition has called the "Doctor Ex1,mius."
1

2

But no doctrine in philosophy can be taken in complete iso•
lation, cut off from its tie-up with everything else the philosopher understood, or from the historical development of that
doctrine through the linkage of the writings of the philosophers
through the ages.

But the historical treatment in this thesis

can, and will, be only incidental.

We are not interested pri-

marily in the concept of relation as it grew from the time it
was first explicitly presented to the philosophic world by Plato
to the time of Suarez.

We are not primarily interested in show-

ing in all its manifold details the internal influence of the
meta~

Suarezian position on predicamental relations on the other
physical and theological tenets of Suarez.

Our

pr~ncipal

task

will be to examine in detail Suarez's position on predicamental
relations, their existence and their nature, the elements of a
predicamental relation, and the various kinds of predicamental
relations;

then, we shall subject the initial bases of that

doctrine to metaphysical analysis in order to determine the
validity of Suarez's stand and the value of his arguments.
In the course of the exposition we shall have to treat in
passing some of the opinions of Suarez's predecessors on this
very question, but we shall do so only in so far as they in some
way contributed, either positively or negatively, to Suarez's
own stand, rather than for any merit or demerits they might possess in themselves.
With this as our aim and our scope we can briefly take note

3

of the procedure and method we shall employ in the following
pages.

..

Our key source will be the forty-seventh disputation of

suarez's Disputationes Metaphysicae. 1

The greater part of the

material considered in the purely expository chapters of the
thesis will be taken directly from this source.

The necessary

background, principally historical, will be culled from leads
in Suarez himself, traced through such books as Migne's Patrologia Latina, DeWulf, Ueberweg, and others that will be

mention~

ed in the text or footnotes throughout the paper.
The thesis itself conveniently divides itself into two
parts:

the quest for Suarez's exact understanding of the exis-

tence and nature of predicamental relations.

Here we will be

primarily concerned with historical truth, establishing what
Suarez actually held in regard to the fourth predicament.

Se-

condly, we shall undertake a critique of Suarez's position in
the light of metaphysical principles.

These will be proved only

in passing and in so much as they enter immediately i.nto the
question at issue.

This chapter will view the ontological truth

of Suarez's stand.
With this as a prelude, let us turn to our task, and watch
Francis Suarez attempt to unravel the problem of predicamental
relations.
1

Franciscus Suarez, Opera Omnia, L. Vives, Par1siis, 1856 ...
1877. 26 vols. Disputationes Metaphysicae, vols. 25-26.

CHAPTER II
TEE EXISTENCE OF REAL PREDICAMENTAL RELATIONS
If there is on thing that strikes us more soundly than anything else when we turn our philosophic eyes on the reality
about us of which we are a part, it is its relational nature.
Reality 1s not merely a reality of static absolutes.

It is dy-

namic, and this radical dynami sm shines forth in its ·every aspect.

We are affecting things and things are affecting us.

Everything is in some way similar to every other being and yet
In some way different and distinct from everything else.

It is

a reality where every being is struggling to immortalize itself
by reproducing itself continually, by stamping its own personality on all with which it

c~mes

in contact.

It is a reality in

which efficient and final causality are the main motif.

Things

are changing us, and we become dependent upon things in our
knowledge, our volition, in our entire physical and psychic
make-up.
It is a growing reality, an evolving process, which yet in
some way is bound together by a thin thread of unity and synthesis.

It is a reality where relations are obvious and absolutes

need justification.

Plato spent half his life and all his mind

in trying to prove that there are absolutes beneath the pheno*
menal relative, only to turn in his last days to find that he
4

5

had destroyed even the possibility of explaining the dynamic
rel ati vism he had taken for gran'ted. 1
But even though the relational aspect of reality is obvious
yet when a philosopher tries to dissect it metaphysically, he
finds that it has difficulties all its own.

Francis Suarez was

not blind to any of these difficulties.
Before Suarez set out to discover the causes of the patent
relativity of things, he stood back for a moment and took a
backward glance over the thoughts of the men who had

Pl'6C eded

him.
Aristotle brought the whole question of relations to a head
when in the fourth chapter of his Categories he wrote:
Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity,
quality, relation, place, time'2Position, state, action or affect.
Note the first words of this quotation:
in no way composite ••• "

"Expressions which are

It would seem that Aristotle derives

the categories from our speech and the various and diverse ways
we can speak of things, rather than from an analysis of exist"

1

a

Julius Stenzel, Plato's Method of Dialectic, transl. 'by D. J.
Allan, Clarendon Press, Oxford,-r940, xxviii-xxix. Also cf.,
Sir James George Frazer, The Growth of Plato's Ideal Theory,
Macmillan and Co., London-;-I"930, 94 ...Dio.
Richard McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle, Random House,
New York, 1941. The Categories, trans1. by E. M. Edghill,
I b 2.6.

6

ing reality as suoh. 3
about things;

There are ten different ways of talking
•
but this is not to say that there are neoessarily

ten different modes of real being, at least, in the sense that
eaoh oategory outs off and tags some partioular being or prin w
ciple of being in the real order.
Almost all the philosophers from Aristotle up to the time
of Suarez himself freely admitted the ten categories or predioa"
ments:

ten ways of predicating.

There was not, however, the

same unanimity on the question whether there are ten real beings
or kinds of being, each really distinct from every other being
or prinoiple, to correspond to the ten-fold division of the
predicaments.
signs of things

It is true that our speeoh and our words are
-~

signa

sup~ositiva

rerum -- and that the modes

of predioation are proportionate to the modes of being, 4

but

many philosophers have interpreted this to mean that the being
may either be in reality or in the mind. 5

Thus the mere faot

that there are ten oategories or predicaments is not neoessarily
indication or proof that there are ten beings in reality, or
that when a philosopher admits the categories, he, by that very
faot, intends to commit himself to ten different really distinot
kinds of being existing as such in reality.
3

George Grote, Aristotle, John Murray, London, 1872, I, 83.
Sister M. Marine Scheu, The Catiiories of Being in Aristotle
and st. Thomas, Cath. Un!V7 of
ere Press, WashIngton, 1944,

3:-4

5

s. Thomae Aquinatis Commentarium in Aristotelis Libros Phfsicorum, in opeIt Omnia, Typls P. FIiocadori, Parmae, 1852- 873.
Vol. XVIII, L er fII, leota 5, n. 15.
This will be olear when we make our historioal survel.

7
So when Suarez approaches the problem of the predicaments
and of predicamental relations in particular, he cannot merely
fall back on the evident fact that we do talk about things in
this way.

He must determine in some other way whether there is

a reality, a relative reality, which corresponds to our words

.

and ideas which are relative, in the form of a distinct prlnci w
ple of real being.
But at the outset, at least, this much can be said:

if

the ten predicaments do not of necessity demand ten real beings
or kinds of being really distinct from one another, it is equally true that if there are only ten ways of speaking of real
things, then anything that is real about these things, must fall
within the ambit of these ten predicaments. 6

If things are

really quantified, then that which renders them quantified must
fall under the predicaments, omitting for the moment all consideration of the precise nature of that quantity.
is true of relation.

The same

If things are really relative, that in

virtue of which they are relative must be included in the predicaments, and under the predicament of relation.
But Suarez first limits what he means to include in this
fourth predicament, and what he intends to exclude.
If the predicaments are ten ways of speaking of real beings
then the predicament of relation will include only real rela6

Scheu, 7.

a
tiona.

•

Cum. ergo relationes ration1.s non sint
entia reaIia, et consequenter nec vera
entia, non possunt ad praedicamentum
Ad aliquid, quod reale est, pertinere. 7
suarez, who is always careful to take note of st. Thomas's stand
on any point, says that some have thought that St. Thomas want w
ed the predicament of relation to contain under it both real and
rational relations and to be predicated of them univocally.

For

st. Thomas writes in his Summa,
••• considerandum est quod solum in his
quae dicuntur ad ali quid inveniuntur aliqua secundumarationem tantum, et non secundum rem.
For if relation were predicated of them equivocally or analogically, there would be no reason why relations alone of all the
predicaments contain not only real beings, but also rationate
beings.
• •• nam si tantum esset sermo de denominatione aequivoca vel analoga, non tantum
in his quae sunt ad allquld, s.ed etiam in
aliis generibus invenirentur aliqua secundum rationem tantum, utgcaecitas in qualiM
tate, et sic de aliis.
Cajetan, 10

Capreolus, 11

and Ferrara 12

seem to agree with

Suarez, d. 47, s. 3, n. 3.
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theolo~ica, M. E. Marietti, Taurini,
1937, I, q. 29, a. 1.
a so, I, q. 28, a. 2; I, q. 13,
a. 7; Quodl., IX, a. 5; De Pot., q. 2, a. 5.
9 Suarez, d. 47, s. 3, n. ~ ---10 S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia, iussu impensaque P.M.Leonis
XIII edita, ex Typographia Polyglotta, Romae, 1888-1930. Vol.
~Summa Theologica cum Cajetani commentariis, In I, 28, 1.
11 Capreolus, In Summam TEeolo~icam, d. 33, q. 1.
12 Aquinatis Opera omnia, T. X II, Summa Contra Gentiles cum co
mentarils E'ranciscl de Sylvestris Ferrariensis, L. IV,-C: I47
7
8

cr.

9

They claim that the nature and properties of relations as
•
such can be applied equally to rational and real relations, for
both can be said to be quorum totum

~ ~

ad aliud se habere.

But Suarez denies that relations of reason are truly relations, and so they cannot be contained under the predicament of
relation.
• •• sicut ens rationis non est verum ens,
sed fictum, sic relatio rationis non est
vera relatio, sed ficta, vel quasi per
intellectum. 13
The ultimate reason for this must be referred back to Suarez's
concept of being, 14

which does not include real and rationate

beings, but only real beings. 15

If being as such cannot be

predicated strictly of both real and

ra~ionate

beings, neither

can the predicament of relation be predicated properly of ratio
al relations, for the predicaments treat only of real being and
are its ten divisions. 16
So Suarez's conclusion is tlrat rational relations really do
not fall under the predicament of relation, but are only conceived as if they were relations, through some kind of analogy
or proportion with real relations •
••• relationes autem rationis non constitui in reali praedicamento, sed per analogiam et proportionem ad veras relationes
declarari ••• 17
13
14
15
16
17

Suarez, d. 47, s. 3, n. 3.
Ibid., d. 2.
IEId., d. 54, intr., n. 1.
IoId., d. 47, s. 3., n. 3.
IbId., n. 5.

.

,

10
suarez claims that this is in perfect agreement with the
•
teaching of st. Thomas who never intended that the concept of
relation should be applied univocally to real and rational relations.
• •• numquam enim (S. Thomas) dixit aut
relationem rationis esse univoce rela·
tionem cum reali, aut esse ad aliud non
esse aliquid reale in relatione reali. 18
st. Thomas meant that the nature of a real relation was such
that through some kind of similitude or proportion, relations of
reason could be thought of as enjoying the formal notes of a relation, since there is some fundament in reality for such a
mental consideration.

st. Thomas, according to Suarez, only

said that the formal notion of relation, sc., ad aliquid, does
not tie itself down to any particular kind of relation, whether
it be predicamental or transcendental, but merely implies a
reference to another. 19

Thus it is easy for the mind fo con-

ceive of rational relations, not because they are truly relations or have a true

~

ad, as in the case of real relation,

but because they can be conceived after the manner of real relations.
So Suarez in the last paragraph of his discussion of real
and rational relations neatly sums up his position on this point
Ad rationem autem illius sententiae facile respondetur, negando propriam rationem
vere reperiri in relatione rationis, quia
18
19

Ibid., d. 47, s. 3, n. 5.
Ibid., but cf. also, S.T., I, q. 29, a. 1.

11

in tali relatione nec est vera habitudo, nec verum esse ad aliquid, sed solum •
apprehenditur ac si esset ad aliquid. 20
In the terminology common among philosophers in their disN
cussions of relations are to be found the terms:
cundum dici and relations secundum esse.

relations se-

A relation secundum

dici, which we shall translate an attributive relation, is a

------thing which is conceived or explained or spoken of after the
manner of a relation, while in reality it really has no true
lationehip.

A relation

secundum~,

re~

which we shall translate

as a genuine relation, is a true and real order to something
else.
• •• relatio autem secundum esse dicitur
quae revera habet proprium esse cum habitudine ad aliud. 21
Because of these definitions, some have equated attributive
relations with rational relations, since both would be something
which 1s really not relative, but only conceived as relative.
But Suarez denies that attributive and rational relations
are the same;

for relations of reason are relations according

to an existence proportioned to them, namely, a rational existence, while attributive relations do not enjoy any existence
whatsoever.
• •• nam relat10 rationis, eo modo quo
est, censetur esse relat10 secundum
esse sibi proport10natum, ut patet de
20

21

Ibid., d. 47, s. 3, n. 5.

Ibid., n. 6.

12
relatione generis et speciei ••• quia eo
modo haec cogitantur, non solum ~~cun
tur, sed etiam sunt ad aliquid.

•

Nor are attributive relations limited merely to rational
relations;

they also can be applied to any real being whose

existence is absolute, but which we explain and express in a
relative manner •
••• relatio secundum dici non limitatur
ad relationem rationis, sed dic1tur de
quacumque rea11 re, cujus esse sit absolutum, et a nobis non nisi per modum
habitudinis seu relationis relativae
explicatur. 23
For example, Suarez cites divine omnipotence as an attributive
relation, not because of any rational relationship which we set
up, but because we cannot conceive or talk about God's omnipotence, except with something else concomitant to it to which
God is said to have some kind of relationship.

Though this man-

ner of speaking does imply a manner of conceiving the thing, yet
that conceptual manner is not such that from it necessarily
would result a rational relation.
one had as a result of comparison.
something

ab801ut~,

It is not a reflex concept or
It is a direct concept of

which we, because of our imperfect mode of

cognition, must conceive after the manner of those things which
we know to be relative.

Thus, in attributive relations we do

not impose any kind of relation on the thing, either real or raM
2a
23

Ibid., d. 47, s. 3, n. 8.

Ibid.

13

tiOnal , but the relative nature of the thing conceived :s entirelY drawn from the knower himself, not from the thing known •
••• in quo modo concipiendi non attribuitur ipsi objecto cognito habitudo ulla
nec realis nec rationis, sed solum ex
parte concipientis fit conceptus per quamdam imitationem et analog~im ad conceptus rerum respectivarum.
We often conceive of spiritual things after the manner of
the corporeal things around us.

We do not intend to place any

corporeity in the spiritual objects, but we must conceive of
them in this way since this is the only manner our mind can
grapple with something which is strictly beyond their proper
range.

The same is true of attributive relations:

we conceive

of something relatively after an analogy with things which we
know as relative.
Et sic interdum concipimus rem absolutam
instar respectivae, et de illa ita loquimur ac si respectivu esset, at ideo dici
tur esse relativa secundum dici tantum. 25
So it is clear that Suarez o_oes not mean to include attributive relations.under the predicament of relation, for nothing
receives a peculiar nature merely from the fact that we conceive
of it or speak of it in a certain way.
We have already seen that for a relation to fall under the
predicament of relation it must be a real and genuine relation.
24
25

Ibid.
Ibid.

14
The next question in our attempt to restrict our

subjec~

of

predicamental relations is whether every real and genuine relation is also a predicamental relation.
negative.

Suarez answers in the

He believes that there are some relations which are

not restricted to anyone particular predicament, but essential-

ly pertain to various and almost all classes of being.
Praeter has vero esse alias habitudines veras etiam et reales, essentialiter pertinentes ad varis et fere ad
omnia genera entium, quae pr0 Pterea
transcendentales dicuntur. 2 6
These are called trs.nscendental rela ti ons ;

they transcend any

one predicament and weave in and out of all of them.

Predica-

mental relations, however, as we shall see, enjoy a certain kind
of being which allows them to constitute a distinct class of
being, a distinct predicament.
Suarez gives several examples of what he mAans by transcendental relations.
other;

Matter and form are really related to each

each is defined through its reference to the other.

The

S8.roe can be said of accidental potencies which are essentially
and intrinSically ordered to their proper acts and receive their
specification from them.

Such relations are transcendental;

they are real and true relations •
••• dentur relationes transcendentales,
quae non sint tantum secundum dici, sed
verae et reales habitudines secundum
esse.... Et potest confirmari, nam in
2.6

I bid., d • 47, s. 3, n. 10.

15
genere substantiae materia et forma
habent inter se veram et reale~ habitudinem essentialiter inclusam in proprio esse illarum •••• Eadem ratio est
de potentiis accidentalibus per se primo inst~;utiS et ordinatis ad suos actus •••

•

Suarez proposes the objection that no real reference is included in the concept of anything absolute.

But a transcenden-

tal reference would necessarily be included in that of an absolute.

Therefore, it cannot be a true and genuine reference, but

only according to our ms.nner of speaking and thinking.
Dices: nullus realis respectus includitur in conceptu rei abs:)lutae; sed hie
respectus transcendentalis includitur in
conceptu rei absolutaej ergo non est
verus respectus secundum esse, sed tantum secundum modum loquendi et concipiendi nostrum. a8
Scotus succumbed to this objection and ended by admitting
that a transcendental relation is not of the intrinsic nature
of any being, but rather has to be reduced to the real predicament of relation. 29
But Suarez would rather agree with Cajetan in saying that
it is not contrary to the nature of any absolute to include
within its essence a transcendental reference, proportionate to
its nature.
27
28

29

For example, aptitudinal inherence is of the very

Ibid., d. 47, s. 3, n. 11.
Ibid., n. 12.
Joannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia., apud Ludovicum Vi v~s, Parisiis, 1904, Tomus XVII, ~ Llbrum Quartum Sententiarum,
d. 12, q. 1.

16

nature of an accident and is not, as it were, a property conse~

quent upon that nature •
••• non esse contra rationem rei absolutae, ut in sua essentiali ratione inclu*
dat respectum transcendenta1em, suae naturae proportionatuc. 30
Also, no created being is so absolute as to exclude an eSN
sential relation of dependenc& upon that being which is being
of its very essence.

For, perhaps, the actual dependence is

distinct from the created being, yet the aptitudinal and necessary dependence is not distinct;

it flows from the very essence

of any contingent being •
••• verisimile est, in entibus creatis nu111nn esse ita absolutum, quin in sua essentia intime inc1udat ali quem transcendenta1em respectum, sa1tem quatenus est ens
per partiCipationem, per se essentia1iter
pendens ab ente per essentiam. 31
Such relations as these, of matter to form, form to matter,
accident to substance, active potencies to their act, an act to
its object, include within their very essence an intrinsic refe
ence to another

princip~e

or another being.

This relation can-

not be confined to the predicament of relation, but is transcendent and transcendental.
Suarez takes his basic distinction between transcendental
30
31

Ibid., d. 47, s. 3, n. 12.

Ibid.

17

and predicamental relations from a notation of Cajetan. 32;

•

cajetan wants to distinguish the two types of relations by reason of their terms.

He says that a predicamental relation views

its term precisely in so far as it is a term, pure sub ratione
termini.

A transcendental relation looks to its term, not pure-

ly as term, but under some other determination:

either as a

subject, as an object, as an agent (efficiens), or as an end
(finis).
In hoc enim differt relatio pertinens
ad praedicamentum relationis ab aliis
respectibuB caeterorum generum, qui a
quibusdam transcendentes vocantur, quod
respectus pertinens ad genus ad aliquid
essentialiter est ad aliud, non ut. receptivum vel causam efficientem aut finalem aut formalem, sed praecise est ad
aliud tamquam terminum; unum enim relativorum nec est forma nee finis g~c efficiens alterius, sed terminus.
This reasoning Suarez finds sound.

Since relations are

specified in some way by their terms, if two relations are dif.
ferent, they should differ in some way, at least, by reason of
their terms.
• •• omnis respectus sumit speciem suam a
termino, seu ab ea re ad quam tendit; et
ideo, s1 quod est d1scr1men inter hos duos
ordines respegtuum, ex terminis desumendum videtur. 4
.

3a Thomae de Vio Cajetani, In de Ente et Essentia D. Thomae A u
natis Commentarium, cura-et-Studio P7 M. H. Laurent, Mariett!, Taurlni, 1934, c. 7, q. 16.
33 Suarez, d. 47, s. 4, n. 9.
34 Ibid.

~------------------------------------------------1-8--'
, there are two difficulties which Suarez
. takes
Neve~theless

uP before he is

wi~ling

to rest his position on this line of ar-

gument.

mo~ion,

action, and passion all imply a tran-

First,

scendental relatiorl to their term, and seem to view that term
only in So far as

~t

is term •

••• motus, actio et passio dicunt transcenoentalem respectum ad terminum, et
tamerl non respiciunt ilIum, nisi sub
pura ratione termini. 35
The second difficuJty which Suarez envisages is that every rela-

.

.

tion, taken abstraotly and in general, only implies a reference
to such a term whioh is a cause, an effect, an object, or in
some

othe~

way partakes of the nature of a term.

For example,

paternity __ granting for the sake of argument that it is a
predicamental relation --

v~ews

a term which is the effect pro-

duced.
• •• omnis respectus, si abstracte et in
communi sumatur, solum dicit habitudi~
nem ad aliud sub ratione termini, abstrahendo ab aliis rationibus •••• 36
The first of these two difficulties Suarez dismisses as a
pseudo-difficulty.
Respondetur tamen ad priorem rationem
laborare in aequivoco.... Hoc autem
modo non potest dici motus, aut actio,
vel passio esse purus respectus ad terminum; nam habitudo motus ••• non dicit
habitudinem ad terminum, ut respicien35
36

bz

Ibid.

Ibid.
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tem tantum, sed, ut constituendum per
ipsum, et ita non respicit ut pure terminum in praedicto sensu; atque idem
est proportlonaliter de actione et passione ••• 37
A predicamental relation is said to view another purely as term,
because it exercises no other function concerning that term than
to direct the subject to it, nisi respiciendi tantum.
clearly not the case in

motio~,

just orientations to a term.

This is

action, or passion; they are not

The order which motion enjoys to

a term is as a means to that term, a via ad terminQm.

So motion

not only looks toward that term, but in a sense constitutes it.
Thus it cannot be said to view its term purely and merely as a
term.

The same is true of action and passion.

Suarez considers to be transcendental relations.

All of these
Thus a tran-

scendental relation does exercise some function regarding the
term other than merely relating the subject to that term;

these

functions may be either those of causality, unity, representation, etc.

Predicamental relations, on the other hand, merely

look toward the term, nothing more.

This is clear in the case

of relations of similitude between two white objects.
The second difficulty also has its answer.

To view some-

thing purely as a term is not to view that term abstractly or
in general, as the second difficulty supposed.
Unde etiam patet responsio ad alteram
rationem, in qua etiam laboratur in ae37

Ibid., d. 47,

8.

4, n. 10.

quivoco.' Nam respicere aliud ut pure
terminum, non est respicere terminum
abstracte et in communi ••• 38
Different specific predicamental relations view different specific terms.

What is common to all predicamental relations, even

in the concrete, is that they are content merely to view their
term without exercising any other function;

the function of a

transcendental relation is, besides viewing and referring the
subject to the term, to exercise causality of some kind on the
term.
Another difference between the two types of relations is
that a predicamental relation is of such a kind that it is never
in itself intended by nature.

It never of itself comes lnto

being through some efficient action.
dation and term, once they are given.

It follows upon the founBut transcendental rela-

tions, according to Suarez, are often of themselves intended by
nature;

the form essentially including such a transcendental

.

reference often essentially comes into being through the action
of some agent.
Respectus ergo praedicamentalis talis
est ut a natura non sit per se inten·
tus, et ideo nunquam per se fit ex vi
actionis alicujus agentis, sed consequitur posito fundamento et termino ••••
At vero respectus transcendentalis saepe
est per se maxime intentus a natura, et
ideo forma essentialiter includens talem
respectQm saepe fit formaliter ac per se
primo per actionem proprj,am •• 0 39
l

38
39

Ibid., d. 47, s. 4, n. 11.
Ibid., n. 12.

~-----------------------2-l~
suarez quotes heat and the act of vision as two examples of
•
things which contain transcendental relations and whlch directly
are brought into being.
The reason behind this is the one we have just seen.:

a

predicamental relation does not exist to fulfil some special and
peculiar function, but merely to ordain something already existing to something else.

On the other hand, transcendental rela-

tions do have a special office to fulfil, and so directly come
into being as a result of some kind of action in order that they
may fulfil their individual functions.

This is possible, be-

cause they are always identified with some absolute which is intended by nature.

So the relationship which is included in the

full notion of that absolute also of itself comes into being and
exist s.
Respectus ••• transcendentalis convenit
alic11i formae vel entitati, aut modo
entis, quatenus a natura per se est institutus et ordinatus ad aliquod peculiare munus, quod pOtest
se intendi
per aliquam actionem •••

P45

Suarez mentions a fourth and last distinction between transcendental and predicamental relations.

A predicamental relatio

is conceived as some kind of a form, slight and accidental, it
is true, which does not give any new added entitative perfection
to its subject, except to view something else;

40

h

Ibid., d. 47, s. 4, n. 12.

while a tran-

~----------------------2-2~
scendenta1 relation must be taken as an essential difference,

.

rather than as a special accident, which exerts causality of
some kind on some other being.
Tandem ex his inte11igitur, respectum
praedicamentalem concipiendum esse tanquam formam quamdam minimam et acciden·
ta1em, quae non dat subjecto a1iquod esse,
nisi respicere a1iud, neque ad ali quid
a1iud in natura deservit. Respectua •••
transcendentalis hon est ••• integra forma,
cujus munus sit tantum referre, sed essentialis modus, seu differentia a1icujus
formae seu entitatis, quatenus ad causan
41
dum a1iquo modo, vel operandum circa alia •••
N

Thus Suarez has limited his subject.

He intends to discuss

predicamental relations which are real and genuine.

But before

going on to Suarez's discussion of the existence and nature of
these predicamental relations, let us take a brief glance at
what some of Suarez's predecessors held concerning this predica.
mente

HISTORY OF THE QUESTION
Although the division of being into the ten categories was
not formally introduced into philosophy until the time of Aristotle, because of the intimate connection of the categories with
being and the fundamental problem of the one and the many, even
the pre-Aristotelians were in some way conscious of some of the
problems which the various classifications of reality presented.
41

b

Ibid., d. 47, s. 4, n. 15.
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For our

purpose~

however, we can omit the

from our historical survey.
:tst s ,

Pre~Socratics

They were for the most part

mon~

and were intent on developing that aspect of their

philosophy by seeking the material cause of things.

But it is

only when one admits a real pluralism that the problem of rela"
tions arises.
The first important philosopher deserving of special consideration is Plato.

To understand the Platonic theory, we must

understand that Plato began philosophy primarily as an ethician.
He was interested in the Socratic problem of knowledge only as
related to the

establish~ent

of stable moral and ethical ideas.

The early dialogues bear this out. 43

Intent on founding a fi

absolute, objective basis for such moral virtues as piety, justice, and the

like~

sistent forms or

Plato formulated his theory of ideas, sub-

perfections~

which were the norms and standards

of everything else, thus allowing him to construct a solid metaphysics of morals.
eidon, were the only

These ideas, existing apart in the topos
reality~

or at least, all else was real

only in the degree in which it participated in the ideas. 44
42
43

44

Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, Sheed and
Ward, New York, 1947, 49
-Although the chronological problem connected with the dialogues has been hotly contested, yet enough unanimity of
opinion can be found for the three over-all divisions of the
early, the middle, and the later dialogues. Among the dialogues of Plato's youth and early manhood up to his second
Sicilian journey in 367 B.C., may be found the Euthrphro
(on holiness), the Phaedo (on the soul), the Phaedrus (on
the beautiful), the Laches (on courage), and the Meno.
Plato: Parmenides transl. by ,H. N. Fowler~ G. p.-putnam's

~--------------~
2:4
Being for Plato meant
the same in itself.

45

that which is always
•
In the Platonic synthesis immutability was
self~identity,

a property of being, so that there was no room for change or
motion within being.

Here Plato met a stone wall:

the isola w

tion and transcendence of the ideas, their remoteness from the
sphere of what is commonly regarded as reality, was bound to
become a seriolls problem.
Just as the absolute nature of the ideas militated against
a Rolution or explanation of the problem of motion and change,
it equally blocked the door to an understanding of the nature
of relation. 46

The basic Platonic error, as St. Thomas fra M

quently points out, 47

was to confuse and identify the mode of

mental existence with the mode of real existence.

Because the

mind, due to its spontaneous abstractive process, conceives
things in their absolute natures, prescinded from their individualizing characteristics and all concrete relationships with
everything else, Plato thought that if the mind was to be a true
reflection of reality, things had to exist in an absolute state
independently of the mind. 48

The result was that he hyposta-

Ibid.
Thomas Aquinas, In Metafhrsicam Aristotelis Commentaria, ed.
Cathala, Mariett!; Taur n , 1926, L1ber I, lect. 14, n. 213.
47 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae et Quaestiones Duo~
decim Quodlibetales, Vol. III, De Veritate, Marietti, Taurin1, 1931, q. 21, a. 2.
-48 S. Thomae Aquinatis Tractatus de Spiritualibus Creaturis,
'edita a Leo W. Keeler, S.J., apud aedes univ. Gregorianae,
Romae, 1946, art. 9, ad 5 (114). Cf. also, Francis Macdonald Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, Harcourt,
Brace, and Co., New York, 1935, 2.

45
46
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tiZ ed his concepts in the real order and demanded a real world

•

of absolutes.

In fact, this world of abstract essences was the

only real world in the strictest sense of real;

the world of

sense was real.only to the extent that it participated in the
reality of the absolutes.

In such a reality where everything

was complete and fully realized in all its potentialities in itself, there was no pla.ce for such a metaphysical monster as re ...
la ti an.
Nor could Plato grant there is a real relationship between
the ideas and the things of sense without falling into an

in~

finite series of sources of similarity •. For if things participate in. the ideas through similarity, this, according to Plato's
own premisses, could only be because both the things and the
ideas participate in a further idea, which cannot be similar to
the previous idea or things unless all participated in a still
more ultimate idea.

Plato concludes in his-Parmenides:

"Because," said Parmenides, "we have
agreed that those ideas are not relative to our world, nor our world to
them, but each only to themselves. n
"Yes, we have agreed to that." 49
Therefore, relation for Plato is ultimately inexplicable, since
tie demands that the ultimate explanation of relation be found
in the ideas.

But the ideas are absolutes;

therefore, relation

can strictly have no place among the ideas, and so it has no

49

Plato: Parmenides, 134 D.

b

26

lace in reality.

p

'"

Plato realized the weakness of his theory on this point,
and so tried to include such ideas as likeness, otherness, etc.,
1n the topos eidon. 50

This was really to distort the basic

notions of relation, for Plato was forced to treat these relative notions as

absolute~

Likeness was an absolute and as self-

contained as his idea of being.

If things in the world of sense

were similar or like, for Plato it was because they participated
in the absolute idea of likeness, not because of any relation
between the two things themselves.

But it is clear that two

things could not become really relative through individual participation in an absolute.
But Plato, to be true to his metaphysical point of departure, could say no more than this.

We have spent a good deal

of time on Plato since, as we shall see in our critique, Suarez
to a limited extent, fell into many of the same basic difficulties.
Aristotle, though he frequently speaks of

7Tfo.s

7,

and

~f;5 r, ;X~f in the course of his Organon and Metaphysics, is

far from

givi~g

us a developed theory of relation.

In the

seventh chapter of his Categories he defines the relative:
50

Plato: Sophistes, transl. by H. N. Fowler, G. P. Putnam's
Sons, New York, 1928, 254 E ff.

Those things are called
being either said to be
or related to something
ed by reference to that

relative, which,
of something else.
erse, are exp~ain
other thing. I

Note that Aristotle speaks of the relative rather than of relation as such.

He always considers the concrete subject which is

similar, unlike, etc.

In the Metaphysics he describes what is

relative as the least of all entities. 52

His reason for this

is that it alone has no proper generation or destruction or move

mente 53
Aristotle never speaks clearly of the exact nature of
tlon in itself;

rela~

he does mention, however, that several of our

terms are relative and some beings are relatlve.

There does not

seem to be a clear-cut distinction between this category and the
others.

In fact, the other categories seem in some way to imply
54

relation in their essential make-up.
the category of

,

~foS 7,

involve some other category as well:

,

larger involves Uorov, earlier

~6U

,

loudest

~o,;v

."

And "all predicates in

55

I

/TO 7:t

,

slave v:'frKt"'"

farthest,

But, as Sr. Scheu has written,

That Aristotle made relation a separate
category, because, as Joseph thinks,
51

52
53
54

55

Aristotle: Categories, 6 a 37. For other important remarks
on the relative, cf.: Cat. 1 b 26;
103 b 22; An. Post.,
83 a 21, 83 b 16; Soph:-!I., 178 a ; n. Post., 8~ 20;
Ig~' 120 b 37, 152 a 39~hys., 225 b~ Meta., 1017 a 25,
a 8; Ethic. Nich., 1096 a 24; Meta., 1088 823, 1071a30.
Aristotle: The MetaphysiCs, transl. By Hugh Tredennick, G. P
Putnam's Sons, New York, 1933-1935, 2 vols. 1088 a 23.
Ibid., 1088 a 30.
Scheu, 2:1.
H. W. B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1916, 64-.-

90Pi
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predicates of relation denote "less than
others what a subject is" seems pl~usi~ •
ble in view of the Stagirite's claim that
all the adjectival categories should pre~
sent the individual subject in a specific
light. 56
In his discussion of relatives in the Metaphlslcs, 57 Aristotle shows that relations are based on any of three foundati
1) unity and number; 2) action and passion;

and 3) measure.

It

1s clear that not all of these relatives are equally real, but
the precise extent of the reality of the various relations is
left untouched ..

We should take note of the very undeveloped state of relations as they exist in the logical and metaphysical treatises of
Aristotle.
tions, 58

There is no question of real or rational relagenuine or attributive, transcendental or predica ...

mental.
The philosophers in the centuries after Aristotle for the
most part were in agreement in maintaining the division of the
ten categories, with relation among them.
the Neo-Platonists 60

The stoics 59

and

worked out different systems to cata-

logue reality, but both outlines had little influence outside of
56
57
58
59
60

Scheu, 21.
Aristotle: Metaphysics, 1020 b 26~32.
Scheu, 33.
Adolf Trendelenburg, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre. His~
torische Beitrage Zur Philosophie:-verlag von G. Bethge,Berlin, 1946, 2 vols. 220.
Friedrich Ueberweg, History of PhiIOSOPh~, transl. by George
Morris, Charles Scribner's Sons, New Yor , 1892, 2 vols.,249

tneir

pr~~er

schools.

61

•

Boethtus in his De Trinltate Liber is noteworthy for his
development of the problem of relations. 62

Because of the

dogma of tQe three Persons in One God, the early mediaeval theolOgian-philosophers found the reality of at least some relations
thrust uPan. them.

They held that the real unity of God was in

substance and the real

p~urality

of Persons lay in relations.

It is clear that Boethius wanted quantity and quality to
be real inQerent accidents which definitely add to the perfection of the substance. 63

It is equally clear that he did not

consider the other seven accidents in this same sense:
Reliqua (i.e., praedicamenta) vero neque
de Deo, neque de oaeteris praedicantur:
naro ubi, vel de Deo, vel de homine praedicar! poteat; de horoine, ut in foro; de
Deo, ut ubiquej sed ita, ut non quasi
ipsa sit res id quod praedicatur, de qua
dicitur. Non eniro ita homo dicitur in
foro esse, quemadmodum esse albus vel
longus, nec quasi circumfusus et determinatus proprietate aliqua, qua designari secundum se possit, sed tantum quod sit iIIud aliis informatum rebus, per hanc praedicationem ostenditur. 64
Quod aliae quidem quasi rem roonstrant, aliae vero circumstantias rei; quodque ilIa
quidem ita praedicantur, ut esse aliquid
rem ostendant; ilIa vero, ut non esse,
sed potius extrinsecus aliquid quodam modo
61

62
63
64
b

Herbert W. Blunt, "Logic," The Encyclopedia Britannica,
11th edition, XVI, 904.
--Boethius: Q! Trinitate Liber, Migne, Patrologiae Cursus
Comp1etus, Series Latina, Paris, 1841, LXIV, 1254 A.
Ibid., 1252 B.
Ibid., 1252 D.
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affigant. 65

•

And he mentions the predicament of rllation explicitly:
Non igitur dici potestpraedicationem
relativrun quidquam reU~ qua dicitur
secundum se" vel adderl, vel minuere
vel mutare. Quae totanon in eo quod
est esse consistit" se~in eo quod est 66
in comparatione aliquolodo se habere.
So" although Boethius maintains the reality of relations"
he does not want them to be considerl! as bringing about a real
addition in the line of perfection

t~their

subject.

In speak-

ing of relations, he writes,
Quare quae secundum relaicujus" eo quod
ipsa est" proprietatem,non faciunt praedicationem, nihil alte:rna're vel mutare
queunt ~ nUllamque omnil~ variare es sen ...
tiam. 7
The influence of Boethius in thEcenturies after his death
is hardly to be overestimated.

He

W~l

the principal channel by

which Aristotelian logic flowed throtlh the Middle Ages. 68
His interpretations of the

categorie~of

ly mentioned in the long struggle

OVE~

Aristotle are constant-

the problem of universals

which is so intimately connected wit]the nature of the predicaments.
But Boethius was not a pure tral1llator of Aristotle.

He

read into hi s Aristotle a good many l:la.tonic, Stoic" Pythagorean
65
66
67
68

Ibid., 1253 C.
Ibid." 1254 A.
Ibid." 1254 B.
Maurice De Wulf" History of Medielll Philosophy, transl. 'by
P. Coffey, Longmans" Green" and 0., London, 1909, 145.
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and Augustinian doctrines, which influences the thought.of the
following centuries quite as much as his Aristotelianism. 69
Another important contributor, inspite of his Platonic
tendencies, to a further understanding of the categories and
~

predicaments of Aristotle was Gilbert de la Porree.

For, as

De Wulf has written,
In addition to an exhaustive study of
the logical writings and deductive method of Boethius, and of the new logical works commentated by Theoderic of
Chartres though unknown to Abelard, Gilbert also conceived the idea of completing Aristotle's study of the categories. 70
In spite of the fact that the majority of the historians of
mediaeval philos.ophy place Gilbert de la Porree in the camp of
moderate realists, it is important to note that st. Thomas mentions the "Porretani,"

i.e., Gilbert and his followers, when

he is discussing the positi.on of Plato and the Platonists. 71
Gilbert seems to hold that relations are not intrinsic determinants of their subject, but rather are extrinsic to them and
stand outside of them.

~he

reason for this is that "each real

object of conceptual thought is viewed as a distinct and separform." 72
der.
69

Each of these forms exists as such in the real or-

But each of these conceptual forms is an absolute.

There-

Ibid.
Ibid., 194.
71 Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 21, a. 4.
72. Clifford G. Kossel, S.J., "Principles of St. Thomas's Distinction between Esse and Ratio of Relation," Modern School.
man, st. Louis Univ., St. Louis, Vol. XXIV, N. I, Nov. 27.
70
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fore, Gilbert concludes that reality is a realm of
and relations do not enjoy real being,

~

abso~utes

ratio essendi.

73

Quae vero relativa praedicatio tota consistit ••• non in eo quod est esse (quoniam
nulli confert aliquid esse), sed potius
consistit in eo tantum quod est habere se
ad aliud a in comparatione alterius ad alterum. 7~
But a comparison is a meantal act and can exist only in an intellect.

If relations consist in a comparison, then they, too,

must exist as such only in the mind.

They have their being only

in knowledge, and neither add nor diminish the entitative reali-

ty of the relatives.
Quandoquidem extrinsecus accessu comparatio relatio praedicatur, igitur non potest
dici praedicationem relativam, id est relationem praedicatam, vel add ere secundum
se quidquam rei de qua dicitur, vel minuere secundum se, vel mutare secundum see 75
Kossel in his articles on relation concludes along the same
lines:
Though we use the verb to be in predicating rAlation, Gilbert seems to indicate
that it is here a pure copula with no existential significance; it simply indicates
the movement of the mind in pA.ssing from
one term to another. If being is in no
way distinguished from those forms which
corresp6nd to abstract concepts, relation
and all the categories involving relation
must become properties of knowledge alone. 76
73

74
75

76

,

Gilbert de la Porree, In de Trinitate Commentarium, Migne,
patrolo~ia Latina, LXIV, ~84 B.

Ibid., 292 c.
Ibid., 1292 C.
Kossel, 27-28.
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Philosophy continued

~lch

along the lines of

Boeth~us

and

Gilbert de 1a Porree, with the best minds of those thundering
centuries giving their all to the principal problem of the 1.lnivers als •
The majority of philosophers accepted what had become the
traditional stand on the reality of relations.

Almost all of

them developed and distinguished the concept of relations in accordance with the exigencies of Trinitarian theology.

Even st.

Thomas first expounded his theory of relations in connection
with dogma.

There seems to be considerable disagreement as re-

gards the precise doctrine which St. Thomas held on relations.
This much, however, is clear.

He demanded real relations, as

opposed to those of second intention. 77

The distinction

between predicamenta1 relation and foundation is still a matter
of dispute.

The triumvirate of Thomist commentators, Cajetan,

John of St. Thomas, and Sylvester of ]lerrara, are unanimous in
asserting that st. Thomas held a real distinction between relation and foundation;

but, as we aha11 see, Su.arez believes that

he has St. Thomas on his side when he holds out for a rational
distinction.
Perhaps, for our purpose, the most important pre-Suarezian
philosopher in our brief historical survey is Henry of Ghent,
77

Aquinas, de Pot., q. 7, a. 9.
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the Doctor Solemnis.

Although he has been considered by some

'"'
to be a disciple
of St. Augustine, it would be more correct to
call him an eclectic peripatetic. 78

In many aspects of his

philosophic synthesis he is a forerunner of Suarez, and the
doctrines of Suarez on such points as the distinction between
essence and existence in creatures, prime matter's possession
of existence in its own right,' the principle of individuation,
and most to our point, the stand on the existence and nature of
predicamental relations, all harken back to the positions expounded by Henry of Ghent. 79
Henry of Ghent holds that, at least, some relations are
real, because of the explanation of the plurality of persons
in the Trinity as constituted by these real relations. 80

But

not only are the divine relations real, but the intellect discovers in nature things which are really related independently
of the mind.
Quaedam relatio habet esse in singularibus ex natura ips ius rei extra, non ex
opere intellectus, sed quam intellectus
consi~irans rem, invenit circa ipsam
rem.
But the nature of this relative reality is not entirely clear in
78

Maurice De Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, transl. by
Ernest C. Messinger, Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1926,
2 vols. Vol. II, 60.
79 Jean Paulus, Henri de Gand: Essai sur les Tendances de sa
Metaphysique, J. vrin,-paris, 1938,-xii and 332.
-- -80 Henry of Ghent: Disputationes Quodlibeticae de omni ~enere
divinee saiientiae Slam Theo1o~iam vocam~s rere~s me,
Parisils, 51S, 2 va s., III, ,86 v.
81 Ibid., ,",uodl., III, 4, 33 v.
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Because of a radical essentialism at the
•
root of his philosophic intuition, he is hampered by an absothe mind of Henry.

lutism in outlook which makes him want to consider relations as
absolute, though he knows this cannot be.
Quomodo autem fit in eis realltas, non
omnino est perspicuum. Rem enim abBOlutam relationen dicere non possumus;
quidditas enim relationis non est quod
sit aliquid, sed solum quod sit ad aliquid. Res ergo quae relatio est non
potest dici res quae est aliquid sive
quid, sed sol~~ res quae est ad aliquid,
immo res quae est ipsum esse ad aliquid.
Hoc autem quomodo ipsum esse ad ali quid
potest dici §~s, hoc est quod hic obscurum est.
Since relations are essentially opposed to absolutes, and
Henry conceived of every separate essence (identified with its
existence) as an absolute, he concluded that relation could not
be an essence really distinct from its foundation.

It was only

a resultant respect of that absolute foundation.
Et est relatio ista realis, quia fundatur in re, cujus quidditas est respectu
alterius ex seipsa, non per ali quid additum ei. 83
.
For if it were really distinct from the foundation, Henry claims
that it would necessarily be 8.n absolute, and so could act as a
basis for another relation, and so on without stopping.
Et ipsa relatio •.• non est res aliqua alia
ab ilIa super quam fundatu~, sed solum respectus ipsius quantitatis et subjecti
82:

83

Ibid.
Ibid.
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ejus ••• aliter enim super illam rem
primo fundaretur ille respectus, et
ipsa aut subjectum ejus, aut utrumque primo per ilIum respectum referretur ad aliud, et tunc ead~m ratione ille respectus adhuc esset res alia
qua respectu illo referretur ad aliud
••• et esset similiter ire in infinitum. 84
So Henry of Ghent wants relations to be real, but not distinct
from their foundations;

in fact, their whole reality is that

of their foundations.
Nullam realitatem habet relatio, nisi
a suo fundamento ••• ita quod quaecumque relationes super idem fundantur,
eamdem habent realitat~m. 85
As we shall see'in the remainder of this thesis, this is
substantially the doctrine that Suarez adopted on relations,
their existence and nature.

It has its roots in Platonism and

the Pla.tonic confusion of the real and ideal orders. 86

That

Suarez was conscious of his dependence upon Ghent on many scores
is clear from the frequency of his quotations from Henry of
Ghent and his explicit approval of many of the insights of the
Doctor Solemnis.
POSITION OF SUAREZ
The first proof that Suarez himself offers in defense of
the extra-mental reality of relations is really the same as that
Ibid., 85 rand 86 v.
Ibid., Quodl., IX, 3, 75 r.
cr., F. X. Maquart, Elementa Philosophiae, Andreas Blot,
Parisiis, 1938, 1II-2, 188, 89-95, 24. It is important to
read these pages in the order in which they are given.
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of Ghent.

It is theological in essence, not philo•

Sophical.
Since the Catholic Faith teaches that there are three real
relations in God, constituting and distinguishing the three
Divine Persons, it is evident that the concept of relation as
such cannot be merely a word, nor merely an extrinsic denomination proceeding from a merely mental compa.rison.
be something of the thing which is related;
even in God Hirnself.

It really must

this must be true

So Suarez argues that even more so must

relations be something in contingent and created beings.
Docet enim fides ••• esse in Deo tres relationes reales, constituentes et distinguentes divinas personas: ex quo fit
evidens argumentum, conceptum relationis
ut aie, non addendo quod creata sit vel
increata, non ease dictitium, et rem aliquam referri non esse denominationem extrinsecam provenientem ex sola compara. tione mentis, sed esse aliquid reS, quandoquidem in Deo aliquid rei est.
The only reason why relations could not also be had in
created beings would be due either to the degree of perfection
of creatures or because of some implication of imperfection in
the concept of relation as such.

The first is absurd;

for if

relations are not repugnant to God Himself, how could real relations be beneath the perfection of any creature?

In God, it

is true, the relations are substantial, while in creatures they
are accidental, but this does not in any way change the point
87

l

Syarez, d. 47, s. I, n. 11.
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at issue.
cidental.

Relation as such implies neither substantial nor ac•
If there are substantial relations, much more easily

could there be accidental relations •
• •• quia rels.tioni ut sic non magis repugnat quod sit accidentalis, quam quod
sit substantialia, quia sicut accidens
dicit esse in alio, ita substantia dicit
esse in se; si ergo cum hac ratione
conjungi potest esse ad aliud, multo magis cum ilIa; et alioqui creaturae ut
sic non repugnat accidens reale; ergo
nec repugnabit illi talia relatio, quae,
etsi sit accidentalis, aliquid rei sit.

88

Nor can real relations in creatures be rejected on the
score of imperfection, since relation qua relation does not imply any imperfection.

It is true that the fact that they are

accidental relations, does imply some kind of imperfection; but
such imperfection, implied in the notion of accident, is not
foreign to the nature of any creature •
••• relatio ut relatl0 non dicit imperfectionem; quod si aliquid imperfectionis ei adjungitur ex eo quod accidentalis sit, tali~ imperfectio non est
extra latitudinem rei creatae. 89
Suarez admits that many find this theological
the reality of relations hard to digest.

arg~~ent

for

Since Divine relations

are outside all the predicaments and would be reducible only to
the genus of substance, the parity between these Divine relations and predicamental relations might be denied.

8889

Ibid., d. 47, s. 1, n. 11.
Ibid.
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Argumentum ••• Theologicum aliqu1bus non
videtur satia efficax ad ostendendas re- •
lat10nes praedicamentales, quia relationes divisae extra omne praedicamentum
sunt ••• 9
The Divine relation of paternity, for example, which is substantial, can be said to be quasi.transcendentel, i.e., intimately
included in the adequate concept of the whole be1ng or personal
substance.

Suarez, therefore, concludes that from this first

argument one can argue, at most, only to real transcendental
references which are intimately included in the make-up of certa1n beings.

Ex 111is ergo relation1bus non videntur
posse col11g1 relationes praedicamentales,
sed ad summum respectus reales transcendentales 1-1ntime inclusi in aliquibus ent1bus. 9
From reason alone, Suarez advances the argument that many
of our words, which are signs of things, signa suppositiva

rerum, signify relations which exist in things themselves wlthQut any mental juggling on our part.
some extra-mental reality.

These :must be based on

But no absolute being could account

for these relative concepts and words.

Therefore, tncre must

be come relational reality which can act as a real basis from
which we form

O'.lr

concepts and words expressing those concepts.

There must be real relations over and beyond the absolute essences in nature •
•• oprobari hoc solet, praeoipue ex locu90

91

Ibid., n. 13.
Ibid.
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tionibus et denominationibus relativis
quae in rebus ipsis existunt, absque ulla fictione intellectus, quas proinde
necess8.est in aliquo ente reali fundari; non fundantur autem in absoluto;
ergo in relativo; da~~ er60 in rebus
ens reale relativum.•
EXamples of such concepts and words which need a real relative
basis for their validity spring immediately to mind:

greater,

less, equal, similar, near, fa.r away, father, son, etc.
But not merely are individual beings relative in their concrete existence, but the total and complex order in the universe
gives evident and convincing proof that relation, predicamental
relation, is real.

This is but a reiteration of st. Thomas's

proof in the De Potentia. 93
solutes, and yet there exists

The universe is composed of abbetw~en

these beings a certain

order and relationship, which is not of the essence of any being, but is nonetheless real for all of that.

This order is

strictly accidental to these beings which are in themselves absolutes.

Suarez gives an example fr?m the heavenly bodies which

resounds the strain of mediaeval physics.
Nam etsi elements. et coeli alio ordine
constituerentur, res ipsae absolutae
eaedem sunt; est ergo ordo, quem nunc
habent, a1iquid accidentarium ipsis. 94
This extrinsic and accidental order between beings is evi-

9a

93
94

Ibid., n. 12.
De Potentia, q. 7, a. 9.
Suarez, d. 47, s. 1, n. 14.
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We see it in the finality of
•
beings, in their efficiency, in knowledge, in volition. Any
dent in every aspect of reality.

similarity existing between beings is explicable only in terms
of efficiency and finality, terms which imply further relation
ships.

For, as st.

~homas

reminds us, if two beings are similar

it is either because one was the cause of the other,
agit sibi simile,

N

~

agens

or because both of the beings proceeded from

a common efficient cause to which they are related. 95
This patent ordering cannot merely be a product of the
human intellect, for it arises from and in things themselves,
and pertains to the objective perfection of the universe.
Et non est aliq~id per rationem confictum, nam per se constat in rebus ipsis
esse, et ad magnam universi perfectionem
spectare. 96
And so relations !nust pertain·to

8.

special predicament.

They are not of the intrinsic make-up of anyone absolute being,
nor can they be reduceo

t)

any of the other predicaments.

stance, quantity, and quality belong to a being absolutely;

Sub ...
the

last six predicaments in some way follow upon relations, and so
presuppose them.
ment~l

Therefore, there exist in nature real predica-

relations •
••• at non est nisi relatio, quurn neces ...
se est per se ad proprium praedicamentum

95
96

De Veritate, q. 2, a. 14; q. 8, a. 8.
Suarez, d. 47, s. 1, no 14.
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pertinere, ~uia non est de intrinseca
ratione alicujus rei absolutae, nee
etiam signari potest ad quod aliorum
praedic~,entorum pertineat vel revocetur.

•

Suarez briefly mentions two other proofs without developing
them in any detail.
The various relationships found to exist among things can
vary while the absolute form related remains the same.

There ...

fore, over and above the beings which are absolute, there must
also exist real relations irreducible to any absolute predicamente
••• illas esse tales ut accidant rebus
creatis absolutis, possintque variari
in aliquo subject09~ine amissione formae absolutae... .
Also these relationships cannot be explained through any
mere extrinsic denomination.

Secundum est, has ~ ~ denominationes mere extrinsecas... 99
Every extrinsic denomination
is taken from something intrinsic.

But with the denial of real

relGtlons, the only things that could be intrinsic would be an
aosolute of some kind.

But no relative extrinsic denomina.tion

could be had merely from an absolute.

If there is an extrinsic

denomination in any particular instance, it is had only becatise
of some real relation existing in one of the terms.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., n. 15.
99' Ibid.

If one

~---------'43
denies that real relationship, he also has denied the basis
•
for any true extrinsic denomination. 100
Thus Suarez has proved to his own satisfaction that there
are real predicamental relations.

The problems which remain

all spring from a consideration of the nature of those relations

100

,.Ibid.

•

CHAPTER III
THE NATURE OF REAL PREDICAMENTAL RELATIONS
DEFINITION
Thus far, our entire treatment has revolved around the
question whether there are such things as real predicamental
relations.

Suarez now considers the essence or nature of those

relations.
He defines a predicamental relation as:
Accidens cujus totum esse est ad aliud
esse seu ad aliud se habere, seu aliud
respicere. I
claims that this is identical with the second definition that

He

Aristotle gives in the seventh chapter of his Categories. 2

Any strict definition must be had through genus and specific difference. 3
strictly, 4
and

80

None of the predicaments can be defined

since they themselves are the ten supreme genera,

do not fall under any higher genus nor are differentiated

by any specific difference.
However, speaking loosely, we can say that the "genus" in
Suarez's definition of predicamental relation is the term acci-

. Meta.,
a
Ibid., d. 6,

1

DiS

3
4

s. 9, n. 22.
Ibid., d. 39, s. 2, n. 29.

a Ibl.

d. 47, s. 5, n. 2.
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5
d enS, accident.,

This excludes Divine relations which are not
•
accidents, but substantial. It also excludes, as is obvious,

~

all created substances, which can in no way be predicamental
lations.

re~

It also excludes, as may not be so obvious, all ra-

tional relations, since these are not strictly speaking accidents, for accidents are subdivisions of real being.
Accidens ergo positum est in illa definitione loco generis. Per quod imprimis excluduntur divinae relationes, quae non sunt
accidentia, sed substantiae. Excluduntur
deinde omnes substantiae creatae, quae relationes praedicamentales esse non possunt
••• Excluduntur praeterea relationes rationis, quae proprie et simpliciter non
possunt dici accidentia, cum accidens simpliciter dictum sub ente reali contineatur. 6
In this, Suarez stands against Cajetan, who states that the general over-all definition of relation includes both real and rational relations. 7

But, as we saw in the previous chapter,

Suarez wants the formal notion of relation,

~

ad, to apply

only to real relations, and to rational relations only by some
kind of analogy or proportion or comparison w:J.th real relations.8
The second part of the definition, cujus totum
aliud

~ ~

ad aliud se habere,

as its "specific difference,"

~

~

est ad

aliud respicere, is taken

for this phrase specifies and

cuts off predicamental relations from all the other accidents,
5
6
7
8

Ibid., d. 47, s. 5, n. 3.
Ibid.
Cajetan, In Summam Theologicam Commentarium, In I, q. 13, a.7
Suarez, d:-47 , s. 5, n. 3.
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which have their existence only in a subject, not through a
•
reference to something outside that subject.
Altera pars illius definitionis, quae
locum differentiae habet, separat praedicamentum hoc a reliquis praedicamentis accidentium ••• 9
It might seem that this definition would be applicable, not
only to predicamental relations, but to transcendental relations
as well.

But this is not true.

esse est esse ad aliud,
----

When Suarez says cujus totum

we must remember the fundamental dis-

tinction he made previously between predicamental and transcendental relations.

A transcendental relation does more than im-

ply a reference to some other being as its term;
dynamiC functions as well.

it enjoys oth

But a predicamental relation is one

whose entire essence is only to imply an ordination to something else, cujus TOTUM ~ est ~ ad aliud. 10
A second difficulty with Suarez's definition presents itself.

This time it arises from a seemingly intrinsic contra-

diction in the terms of the definition itself.

If a predica-

mental relation is an accident, then it is impossible for its
entire essence to consist in a reference to another.

That es-

sence, in so far as it is the essence of an accident, must also
include an ordination to its subject of inherence, inesse. 11

----.. ------9
10
11

Ibid., d. 47, s. 5, n. 4.
Ibid., n. 5.
Ibid., n. 6.
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• •• nam si relatio est accidens, ergo
non potest totum esse illius cons istere in habitudine ad aliud; necesse est enim ut aliquid ejus in subjecto sit, ut ea ratione accidens
esse posi~t, cum accidentis esse sit
inesse.

•

There are various answers to this objection, but Suarez rejects them, because they all seem to imply in one way or another
a real distinction between the essence and the existence of a
relation by demanding a real diversity between the
and the

~

in.

~

ad and

For example, some claim that when a predica-

mental relation is said to have its whole essence consist in an
orientation to another, what is meant is that the essence proper
to a relation is wholly an order to another, but not that essence under its accidental aspect.
in common with the other accidents.

This latter aspect it has
This gave rise to the dis-

tinction between the esse ad and the esse in of the relation.
According to this opinion, the

~

ad as such, prescinds from

all real existence, and so can be applied univocally to real
and rational relations. 13
But Suarez is adamant in rejecting this line of reasoning,
for, as he reasons, an accident does not just inhere in a subject without being any particular and proper nature.

It is al-

ways a particularized form inhering in this particular subject.

-

12
13

Ibid.
IbId.
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!£

does not commit itself to be what it
•
1s, namely, the particular accidental form of ~ ad, is to
that the

speak of an abstraction, in no way significant in a discussion
of reality.

Also, if the above argumentation were true, Suarez

claims that no predicamental relation would ever attribute its
proper, formal, and relative effect to its subject, since no accident can cause a formal effect unless it is actually inhering
in the subject.

A real relation and a real esse ad cannot be a

real relation and a real
an

~

~

ad

unless it is simultaneously

in.
• •• de ratione accidentis, prout in re
ipsa existit, non solum est quod insit
secundum aliquam rationem generics.m vel
communem, sed etiam secundum propriam,
et prout est talis forma in rerum natura;
imo impossibile est quod forma informet
vel afficiat secundum communem rationem,
et non secundum ali quam propriam, cum
hac ri4ione a parte rei non distinguantur •
••• alias relatio non tribueret subjecto
proprium effectum formalem relativum,
quia accidens non dat effectum formalem,
nisi inhaerendo et afficiendoj si ergo
relatio non inest secundum propriam rationem, non confert pro£Sium et specificum effectum formalem.

Lastly, Suarez objects that if the predicamental relation
did not inhere, it would be nothing:

it would not be a sub-

stance, and upon the supposition that it does not inhere in any

14
15

Ibid., d. 47,.
Ibid.
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5, n. 6.

•

Therefore# it would
•

subject# it could not be an accident.
be

anything real.

~

So Suarez concludes:

••• concedendum est relationem secundum
se totam esse accidens; haec enim ratio
••• est quasi transcendentalis respectu
novem praedicamentorum. Unde# cum dicitur totumesse relationis esse ad aliud#
particular exclusiva ibi virtualiter contenta non excludit concomitantia# seu extrinsecas et transcendentales rationes;
quare, sicut non excludit rationem entis
realis# ita nec rationem accidentis et
inhaerentis. Solum ergo excludit esse
absolutum, et indicat, esse relationis ut
sic non sistere in subjecto, quod suo
modo afficit seu denominat# sed illud ordinare ad terminum, et in hoc positam
esse totam formalem rationem relationis. 16
A predicamental relation must according to its whole nature

~e

an accident, which connotes a transcendental relation to its
subject of inherence.

The only thing# then, which a predica.

mental relation does exclude is an absolute nature;

it does

not stop merely in its ordination to its subject, but goes on
further to refer that subject to another term. 17
But when Suarez says that the essence of a predicamentalr
lation is ad aliud

~ ~

ad aliud

that the eseence of relation is

~

.
actually

habere# does he mean
to refer the SUbject

to the term, or only to be apt to refer that subject so that it
would be related to something else?

It might seem that the

mind can conceive of a relation as affecting its subject, and
yet not referring that subject to anything outside of itself.
16
17

Ibid., d. 47# s. 5# n. 7.
IbId.
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Even the theologians admit that in Divine relations paternity
can be conceived as constituting the first Person of the Blessed
Tr i n it y, pr i or t 0 any re 1 a ti on or re f erence 0 f any kind. 18
Suarez is clear that a thing is apt to be related to something else, not by reason of the relation itself, but by reason
of the proximate foundation.
lation is actually to relate

The proper formal effect of a re-

.
the

subject9

And, as he says,

••• alias nec distingueretur, etiam secundum rationem formalem, a fundamento,
nec requireret coexistentiam termini,
nec vere diceretur totum esse ejus positum esse in respectu ad aliud. I9
In answering this objection Suarez reminds us that it is
not one and the same thing to ask whether the formal effect of
an accident is to constitute something to be such and such, and
to ask whether it is of the essence of an accident actually to
exercise its formal effect.
o.oaliud esse considerare an effectus
formalis accidentis sit constituere actu
tale, aliud vero an de essentia accidantis sit actu exercere suum affectum formalem; haec enim duo distincta sunt. 20
For example, it is true to say that the formal effect of an accidental form of whiteness is to constitute something actually
white, and not only aptitudinally white, although, absolutely
considered, it is not ot the essence of whiteness actually to
18
19
20

Ibid., n. 9.
Ibid., n. 10.
!btd~, n. 11.

51

confer that formal effect on any subject.

Although it is not

.0;

of the essence of whiteness, simply speaking, actually to

con~

.

stitute something white, nevertheless, it is of the essence of
whiteness as affecting and informing a subject, actually to constitute the being white.

The same can be said of relations. 21

There are some accidents which of their very essence can-

.

not exist in reality without affecting a subject;

such are re-

lations.
Relationes ••• non possunt esse in rerum
natura, quin actu referant, eo quod non
possint ab omni subjecto separatae conservari, quia in re non distinguuntur a
suis proximis subjectis ••• 22
For unlike quantity and quality which can, with no intrinsic repugnance, exist (as in the Blessed Sacrament} without an actual
subject of inherence, predicamental relations cannot exist nor
be conceived separated from their proximate subjects.

As we

shall see, Suarez holds that the relations are really identified
with those proximate subjects, their foundations.

But if other

accidents are conserved through Divine power without their proper subject of inherence, then any predicamental relation which
has such an accident for its foundation, can also be conserved
in this way.
Sicut autem verius est, relationem non
esse rem distinctam a fundamento, ita
etiam verius esse non posse ab illo
21
22

Ibid.
Ibid., n. 12.

separatam, vel per se conservari ••••
Unde eatenus etiam pot est talis relatio conservari separata a tali subjecto, quatenus ilIa res, quae est rundamentum ejus,zgotest sine illo subjecto
conservari.

•

As a last point, Suarez insists that it is impossible to
conceive or relation with its formal and proper effect, without
conceiving it as actually relating its subject to the term.

It

may be that the intellect has a confused and indistinct concept
of relation and its foundation, and thus tries to think of it
as not actually exercising its formal effect of relation •
••• impossibile esse concipere relationem cum suo effectu formali plene ac
proprie concepto'22uin concipiatur ut
actu rererens •••
Arter settling the questions of the existence and the definition of a predicamental relation, Suarez then takes up the
elements that must enter into any relation.

ELEMENTS OF A RELATION
No relation of itself ever comes into being;

it results

or follows from the foundation once the term is given.

There-

fore, there is no strict efficient cause or a relation other
than the cause of the foundation and term •
••• cum per se non riat, sed resultet,
23
24

Ibid., d. 47, s. 5, n. 12.
Ibid., n. 13.
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vel formaliter consequatur positis
fundamento et termino, nullam habet
vel requirit efficientem causam, praeter eas quae fundamentum et terminum
efficiunt. ~5

If one held the relation was really distinct from the foundatio
then, perhaps, he could hold some kind of efficiency.

But be-

Suarez denies this real distinction, he must claim only formal
resultancy, not efficient. 26
Since no predicamental relation is ever of itself intended
by any agent, it does not enjoy any strict final cause.
Cum enim haec relatio non sit per se
intenta in rebus, non habet proprie
causam finalem, quamvis eo modo quo est,
dici possit esse propter suum f0 ,alem
effectum, vel propter terminum. 2
Efficient and final causality go hand in hand;

if the efficient

cause is lacking, no final causality in the strict sense of the
word is had.
Since relation is itself some kind of a form, it does not
have any other proper and physical formal cause, but has its
own quiddity and formal metaphysical essence •
••• cum ipsa relatio sit forma quaedam,
non habet aliam causam formalem propriam et physicam, sed habet suam quiaditat~~, et rationem formalem metaphysicam.
25
26
27
28

Ibid., d. 47, s. 6, n. 1.
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In so far as the term specifies a relation, one could say,. perhaps, that the term participates in tfie nature of a formal
c-ause.

The precise nature of this ]articipation we shall see

in more detail in a moment.
The foundation and subj ect fulfill the function of the
material cause of a relation.
Fundamentum vero et
materialem complere

sll~iectum ca~sam
v1j~ntur...
9

So all the causes and principles of

any

relation are to be found

in its subject, foundation, and term.
SUBJECT OF A RELIT! ON
That every predicarnental relath does require a real sub...iect is obvious to anyone who consH!ls the matter howsoever

lightly.

The reasons for this are cliar enough.

tal relation is an accident.
ject.

A predicamen-

But eV!lr accident requires a sub-

Therefore, every predicamentalrelation will require a

subject.
• •• dicendum est omnem r~lationem praedicamentalem requirerealiquod subjectum reale. Haec est clara, nam relatio
es t accidens, ••• omne aut!1Q accidens requirit aliquod subjectun; ergo. 30

A second proof that Suarez tosses of lin passing is that a relation is a form.
29

30

Ibid.
Ibid., n. 2.

But a form must alw8ji inform something;

that
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.hich it informs is called its subject.

Therefore I every pre-

..

dicamental relation demands a sUbject •
••• relatio est quaedam forma; omnia
autem forma aliquid informatj id autem quod informat l dicitur subjectum
ejus l praesertim3fi ei inhaereat l et
ab eo pendeat •••
Sometimes I it is true l philosophers speak abstractly of relation, such as paternitYI similitude l equality, etc.

But in

the concrete l it is really a father or something which is similar or equal to something else.
ways needs a subject.

In the concrete l a relation al-

In fact, what is really relative is the

combination of the subject and the relatlon •
••• nam relativum in concreto non habet
proprie Bubjectum, sed potius ipsurn est
quid constana ex subjecto et relatione l
ai formaliter sumatur ut relativum estl
seu ut compositu~ quoddam ex relatione
et subjecto ejus. 32
Relations are never of themselves relative;

they are that by

which the subject is relative.
Granting that every relation must have a subjectl the queation arises whether one single relation can have more than one
subject or must it be content with one and only one.
Ghent I as he writes in his Quodlibeta l 33

Henry of

thought that since

a relation is between two terms l it could be said to be in both
31
32

33

Ibid.

Ibid.

Disp. Quodl., IX I q. 3.
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terms as in subjects.

Thus, there would be but one relationship

between father and son, between son and father.
Suarez, however, sees this as impossible;

for one and the

same numerical accident could not be in really distinct subjects. 34 For a relation, as a simple form, is strictly one
with a true and proper metaphysical unity;
taneously coexist in two different subjects.

it could not simulOtherwise, a re-

lation would really be an aggregate of two mutual relations,
called a single relation merely for convenience.

But a mutual

relationship, taken as one thing, is a product of reason, and
does not pertain as such to the real order.

So since a predica-

mental relation does not subsist by itself, it must inhere in
something, and in only one subject •
••• ergo necesse est ut in relationibus
realibus et accidentalibus sit aliquid
reale et accidentale, et ita redit argumentum factum, quod debet esse in uno
aliquo subjecto. ~5
Some relations can be said to be in more than one

subje~t,

if those subjects are themselves subordinated one to another.
Verumtamen ~ujusmodi relatio per se ac
proprie solum afficit proximum subjectum, in quo suo modo inest; ad subjectum autem remotum solum comparatur medio proximo, in quantum hoc in illo ininest et sustentatur. 06

-.- - -----.
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For example, the accidental relation of equality inheres im•
mediately and proximately in the accident of quantity, and ultimately in the substance itself.

Likeness has a quality for

its proximate subject, the substance as its

remot~

subject. But

note that in these cases the two subjects are subordinated to
each other, and the relation can be said to inhere in the remote subject only because it inheres immediately in the proximate subject.
Suarez makes an interesting appendage to this point:
••• interdum relatio aeque vel in eodem
modo denominat subjectum proximum et remotum, ut quantitas dicitur aequalis, et
similter substantia materialis; et albedo dicitur similis, et ipsum album, vel
etiam subjectum, ut homo, vel paries. Aliquando relatio denominat subjectum proximum, et non remotum, ut intellectus dicitur referri relatione potentiae ad suum actum, anima vero non item, et sic de aliis.
Aliquando, e converso, relatio denominat
subjectum remotum, vel suppositum ipsum,
et non proximum, ut filiatio denominat
suppositum filium, non vero humanitatem,
quamvis probabileeit proxime inesse humanitati; et paternitas paroxime dicitur
esse in potentia, et tamen non denominat
patrem, nisi ipsum suppositum. 37
Thus, some relations refer both the ultimate and the proximate
subjects to'a term, as in the case of equality and similarity.
Other relations, however, orientate only their proximate subjec~s,

as its in the case of intellection and volition, where

the faculty is related to its operation as potency to act, while
37

!.bid., n. 6.

58

tni S cannot be said of its ultimate subject, the human soul.
still other relations refer their ultimate sUbjects to a term
rather than their proximate subjects.

Suarez's example of this

is in the relations of filiation and paternity, where the relation ordains the entire supposit to the term, rather than the
humanity of the father or the son, which he believes is the
proximate subject of the relations.
The reason behind all this is ultimately the diversity in
the nature of the various foundations.

We shall see Suarez go .

into this matter more at length when we take up his treatment
of the various types of relational foundations.

FOUNDATION OF A RELATION
The second element which Suarez gives as contributing to
the entity of a predicamenta1 relation is the foundation. Suarez
nowhere offers a formal definition of the term foundation, but
it is clear from his constant usage of the term that he accepts
the traditional meaning of foundation as the reason why the subject is related to the term, id propter quod subjectum ad terminum refertur.
The first and most important thing to be said about the
foundation of a predicamenta1 relation is that a real foundation
is required for every real relation.
Circa fundamentum autem re1ationis principio statudendum in communi est, omnem
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relationem rg~lem indigere ali quo reali
fundamento.
There is hardly a philosopher who has ever denied this;

.
its

necessity is obvious.
Suarez gives as his first proof of the necssity of a real
foundation one which is valid only granting Suarez's position
on the distinction, ora ragher the lack of it, between the
foundation and the relation.

Since a relation does not have any

proper entity of its own -- for according to Suarez it is not
really distinct from its absolute foundation
of the entity of something else.

it must partake

But it cannot enjoy the enti-

ty of the term since t.he term is extrinsic and distlnct, while
the entity of a thing must be intrinsic to it.

Thus, the real

relation must take its entity from its foundation, which will
always be required •
••• relatio ex se non habet propriam entitatem ••• ergo necesse est ut habeat illam~ •• ab aliquo alio; ••• habet relatio
realis suam entitatem a fundamento reali;
ergo semper illud requirit. 39
An added reason ts that since no predicamental relation as

such ever of itself comes into being or is intended as the primary object of any agent, it must result from some other cause
which 1s directly intended.

This cause from which the relation

results is the real foundation.
38
39
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••• relatio tal~~t naturae, nec per
se fiat, nec s~~r se intenta in natura; ergo conii~ui tur et quasi resultat in suo subj!~to, posito termino;
ergo requiri t iuubjecto aliquam realem
rationem vel CaUiill1 ob quam in illo resultat talis relatio, posito tali termino. 40
But must this

foundation~!

mate subject of the relationshl,?

•

really distinct from the ultiSuarez first clarifies the

issue by distinguishing betwe!nthe proximate and the remote or
ultimate subject of a relation, Of the former, the proximate
subject of inherence, no otherfoundation is needed than that
very subject, for the

foundat!~n

and proximate subject are one

and the same.
Et quidem de pr!~ri subjecto (proximo)
certum est non ~I~rtere ut praeter illud sit aliud fun!amentum relationis
ex natura rei a~!llo distinctum, alioqui esset abeunuum in infinitum. 41
Thus the relation of equali tylnich inheres immediately in the
accident of quanti ty as in a

su~Ject

needs no other basis or

foundation than quanti ty itself,
But the difficulty arises!n regard to the principal and
ultimate subject.

Is it nece5iary that in respect to the sub-

stance every real predicamentalrelation require another accidental foundation really

distfu~t

from the substance?

Many

claim that such an intermedia1jaccidental foundation is neces40
41
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gary, especially if the relation is not really distinct from
the proximate subject.

These philosophers demand that any ac-

cidental relation must be founded upon another accident, an absolute foundation from which it may receive ita accidental en42
tity.
If this were not true, then the relation, identified
with its foundation, which would be a substance, would no longer
be entitatively an accident, but a substance.
In spite of the fact that Aristotle and St. Thomas seem to
hold that an intermediary accidental foundatton is always re~lired,

Suarez is explicit in denying that an accident must al-

ways be the foundation for a predicamental relation.
Nihilominus dicendum est, necessarium non
esse ut fundamentum proximum relationis sit
aliquod accidens, vel res aliqua, aut modus
realia, ex natura rei distinctus a primo
subjecto relationis. 43
In some cases he thinks the substance itself is sufficient. For
the foundation is nothing other than the real cause why something is related to something else.

There can be no reason why

the intrinsic nature of a being cannot be the cause and reason
why two things are similar, or in some other way related.
Cur enim, sicut quantitas ex sua naturali
conditione et natura habet sufficientem
rationem ob quam ad illam consequantur
quaedam relationes, et similiter qualitas,
non potest etiam substantia simile quippiam habere per seipsam? 44
42
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Many examples could be given, some of which Suarez himself
~

mentions, of instances where a thing is related because of its
very substantial essence.

Creation is on the part of the crea-

ture a predicamental relation;

yet its foundation is the very

nature of the creature itself. 45

For even granting that depen-

dence would be for some a really distinct mode, and that this
mode would be the foundation af the relation of creature to God,
nevertheless, this mode is not an accident, and so does not
touch the point at issue.

Suarez 'cites as added proof the rela-

tion of filiation:
Et confirmatur in relatione filiationis,
quae non potest ita fundari in generatione activa vel passiva, ut illi proxime
insit, nam transacta actuali generatione
permanet relatio filiationis. Nec potest
fundari in alio antecedente, quia nullum
est quod sit causa ejusj fundatur ergo
in ipsamet substantia. Ratio autem est,
quia substantia ipsa creaturae, quatenus
creabilis est, vel generabilis ab alia
causa, est sufficiens ut in ea possit
fundari relatio, si a tali causa, creata
vel genita sit. 46
The foundation of this relation can be nothing other than the
substance of the son himself, for the foundation must endure as
long as the relation is had.

But anything else, e.g., the ac-

tual act of generation, comes and goes, while the relation of
filiation still remains.

The substance of the son in so far as

it is either created or generated is a sufficient reason for
45
46
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the foundation of the relation of filiation;

nothing else is

..

needed.
But what about the objection Suarez himself brought against
this position?

If the relation is not distinct from the founda-

tion, and the foundation is a substance, then the relation, too,
would be a substance.

Suarez writes,

••• de divisione entis in sUbstantiam et
accidens, proprium et physicum accidens
non posse esse in re omnino idem cum
substantia; accidens vero praedicamentale interdum posse sola ratione ratiocinata distingui.... Sic ergo dicendum
est, relationes, quae proxime in substantia fundantur, non esse accidentia
phsyica, et quoad entitatem suam, sed
solum esse accidentia praedicamentalia,
quoad figuram et modum praedicationis,
quia secundum rationem formalem suam
sunt extra rationem substantiae, et ideo
non est inconveniens quod~tales relationes non distinguantur in re a substantia. 47
There is an important distinction present in these words which
must be grasped to understand Suarez's position on the nature
of an accident.

When treating of accidents in general he de-

fines what he means bya physical accident and what he means by
a predicamental accident:
Potest enim accidens sumi, vel pro entitate accidentali secundum se, at secundum
suam tantum realitatem; vel pro qua cumque ratione formali accidentis, quae in
praedicamentis collocantur. Quod aliis
etiam terminis dici solet, accidens posse
47
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Crucial in any discussion of the foundation of a predicamental re1ltion is its distinction from the relation.

Prac-

tically every theory possible on this point has been held by
some philosopher or other through the centuries.
As is his wont, Suarez first review all the previous doetrines and opinions on this question before he states what he
himself holds.
The majority of Thomists, led by Capreo1us, Cajetan, and
Ferrara, demand a real distinction between relations and their
subjects and foundations. 50
Scotus distinguishes some relations which in no way are
separable from their foundations from those which can be separat
ed, as for example, the relations of similitude.

These latter,

Scotus admits, are really distinot from their foundations, while
the others which are inseparable are not really distinct, since
the Scotist criterion of a real distinction, sc1., separability,
is not present. 51
Durandus makes use of still another distinction in this
question.

He claims that there are some relations which are

real orders or references consequent upon their foundations.
There are, however, other relations which are merely relative
denominations, e.g., to be equal or to be similar.
50 Ibid., d. 47, s. 2, n. 2.
51 !bid;, n. 3.

These latter

~re

,

66

not really distinct from their foundations and add nothing

..

over and above the concomitant coexistence of the two absolute
terms.

These denominations Durandus still wants to pertain to

the predicament of relation and be suffiCient" to constitute a
real relation.

Durandus's argument for the real distinction in

the former examples is the old one of separability. 52:
Still others would prefer a modal distinction between relation and foundation;

others argue for a formal distinction. 53

But Suarez rejects all of these positions and finally decides
to place his philosophical chips with the Nominalists, Ockham,
and Hervaeus by placing only a rational distinction between relation and foundation.
Inter has ergo sententias mihi maxime
probatur quinta, quam Hervaeus et nonnulli alii Thomistae docuere, a quorum
sensu fere nihil discrepant Nominales ••• 54
He does not want to admit even for a moment that this rational distinction makes the formal essence of relation nothing
real or merely an extrinsic denomination taken from some absolute form.

This would destroy the real predicament of relation

which he desires to establish.

Rather the relation is some in-

trinsic form of the thing related, but not to be either a thing
or a mode really distinct from any absolute form.
52
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same absolute form, which is its foundation, taken, not abso-

..

lutely, but as viewing and looking toward something else connoted by the relative denomination •
••• respondetur, esse relationis in re
non esse aliud ab esse fundamenti, ratione tamen distingui, quatenus illudmet esse concipiatur ut includens aliquo modo, seu connotans terminum quem
respicit. 55
Thus, the relation of similitude would be nothing other than the
form, e.g., of whiteness, precisely in so far as this form of
whiteness connotes another white object as a term. 56
Suarez believes that such an explanation more than suffices
to explain the various ways of speaking of things, and also to
maintain a distinct predicament of relation.
Atque haec distinctio rationis sufficit,
tum ad diversas loquendi formas, tum
etiam ad praedicamentorum distinctionem ••• 57
The chief argument which his opponents offered in favour
of something more than a merely rational distinction between
foundation and relation was the argument from separability.

If

the term of a relation is destroyed, then relation of the subject to that term also perishes, even though no intrinsic change
has occured as regards the subject and foundation taken in themselves.

If this is true, then the relation must necessarily be

really distinct from that subject and foundation.
55
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answer to that argument is as follows:
••• negamus enim relationem separari unquam a fundamento secundum aliquid reale
quod ei intrinsecum sit. Sed solum contingit, separari aut destitui terminum,
quo ablato cessat etiam relativa denominetio, non quia aliquid rei vel realis
modi auferatur, ab ipso relativo, sed
quia denominatio relativa includit aliquo modo terminum, sine quo non manet actualiter sed fundamentaliter tantum, seu
in proxima aptitudine. 58
Thus, the relation is the foundation as connoting the term.

If

one removes the term, the connotation is destroyed, while the
foundation remains entitatively untouched.
If Suarez's adversaries pushed the point that if a white
object, which was not similar to another, suddenly becomes similar, then that relation of similitude is either something (a
new entitative perfection) or nothing, Suarez would fling back
the reply:
••• praeter ilIa duo membra est aliud tertium, nimirum aliquid rei esse de novo,
non in re, quae prius erat alba, sed in
termino, qui de novo factus est albus,
quem terminum aliquo modo includit seu
connotat ilIa res, quae est similitudo,
sub ratione et conceptu si~~itudinis,
non sub ratione albedinis.
Suarez is careful to explain that this connotation does not
reduce predicamental relation to a mere extrinsic denomination.
The relation is identified with an intrinsic form of the sub58
59
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ject, namely, the absolute foundation, which is relative in so
far as it connotes something extrinsic in the extrinsic term •
••• has denoMinationes respectivas, non
esse mere extrinsecas ••• Unde consequenter
concedimus, nujusmodi denominationem esse
ab aliqua forma intrinseca, includendo
tamen seu connotando aliqua~oaliam extrinsecam in extrinseco termino.
Suarez finds many advantages in this position and many escapes from difficulties inextricably interwoven into the woof
of the other positions.
We saw previously that he objected strenuously to the distinction between the
relation.

~

ad and the

~

in of a predicamental

We saw that some philosophers appealed to this real

dichotomy in order to agree with some texts of Aristotle in
which the matter seemed to claim that a being suffered no intrinsic change upon the advent of a new relation.

Some philoM

sophers explained these texts away by saying that no change took
place by reason of the formal essence of relation as such, esse
ad, but only in so far as that predicamental relation also enjoyed the accidental existence of
For Suarez, the
nor could they be.

~

~

in.

ad and the esse in are not distinct,

An esse ad which is not in itself either

substantial or accidental cannot be anything real.
being
60
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can prescind from being itself.

No mode of
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Falsum item est, verum esse ad, posse
ita praescindi ab esse in, ut illud intrinsece non includat ••• modos entis non
posse ita praescindi ab ente, quin illud in se claudant. 61
But once Suarez holds the real identification of relation
and foundation, he can dispense with this distinction.
~

For the

of a relation is not anything other than the esse of the

foundation.

It is the esse of the foundation as connotative of

a real term. 62
Also, Suarez finds it a simple matter to agree without
further distinctions and qualifications with the texts of ArisM
totle, in which the Stagirite wrote:
Nor is there motion in respect of rel~
tion: for it may happen that when one
correlative changes, the other, although
this does not itself change, is no longer
applicable, so that in ~hese cases the
motion is accidental. 6
Suarez believes that all positions

othe~

than his own would in

the last analysis be forced to disagree with Aristotle. 64
Nor does he think that his rational distinction forces him
to say that a predicamental relation is nothing.

Though it is

not really distinct from the foundation, it is rationally distinct, and this he thinks sufficient to save its reality.
61
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Nam licet relatio non sit aliquid in
re distinctum ab absolutis, potest esse
aliquid ratione distlnctum; et ideo non
sequitur, quod sit simpliciter nihil. 65

~

Relation is real because it is identified with a real foundation;

its total reality is that of its

~oundation.

This is. essential for an understanding of Suarez's doctrine.
for when the relative denomination is said to arise from the
coexistence of many absolutes without any real addition to the
subject, it is mot to be understood that the· denomination is
equally and simultaneously taken from two absolute forms:
intrinsic, the other extrinsic.

one

Rather, the denomination re-

quires the coexistence of such forms, but the relation itself
is taken in each instance from a proper and intrinsic form connoting another.
Sed intelligendum est, illam denominationem requirere quidem consortium, seu
coexistentiam talium rerum seu formarum;
tamen in unoquoque extremo sumi a propria forma ut respiciente aliam, quae
ut sic habet rationem relatlonis, quamvis in re non sit alia ab ipsa forma absoluta. 66
If the foundation is not real, then the relation consequent upon
that foundation is not real, but only an extrinsic denomination
or a rational relation. 67
But still another question arises concerning the foundation
of a relation.

Is the foundation really the same as what Suarez

~Ibid.
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callS the ratio fundandi?

This latter term is untranslatable

because of the various senses in which it is used.

..

As we shall

see, sometimes it is a cause, other times it means nothing more
than a condition;

in several passages it is found to be iden-

tified with the foundation, while in others it is really distinct.

Because of these difficulties we shall keep the term in

its original form.
It would seem, at first, that the foundation and ratio
fundandi are the same;

the foundation of a relation is nothing

other than that by which the relation can modify its subject.
But this fundament would then be the ratio fundandi, the reason
for founding and receiving the relation.

They would seem to be

identical.
Est autem causa dubltandi, quia fundamentum rele.tionis nihil aliud esse videtur quam id quo mediante relatio convenit subjecto; sed hoc ipsum funda"
mentum est ratio fundandi seu recipiendi relationem; ergo haec non distinguuntur. 68
However, some authors would have it that the two would be
distinct, and that the ratio fundandi would be some requisite
either in the fundament or in the extrinsic term.

Thus, as in

the relation of paternity, the generative act is neoessary, even
though it is not the foundation.

Suarez argues that it could

not be the foundation which is always in the subject.
68
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~tive

act as a strict action is not in the agent, but in the

..

patient, the son who is generated.

In this instance, the

generative act would be the ratio fundandi, even though it is
not the foundation of the relation.
Ut ad relationem paternitatis necessaria
est actio generandi, quae non est fundamentum, quia paternitas non habet ab
illa entitatem suam", cum actio generandi sit in filio genito, paternitas vero 9
sit in patrej est ergo ratio fundandi. 6
There seems to be a good deal of confusion on this point in
many authors, but Suarez finds the truth of the matter quite
obvious upon simple analysis.

In every real relation there is

required on the part of the subject, something which is apt and
proportioned to found the reference to some other being.

This

is called the foundation of the relation.
In omni ergo relatione reali requiritur
ex parte subjecti res aliqua, natura sua
apta et accomodata ut fundare possit respectum ad aliud, ut ab illa proxime
habeat relatio realitatem suam, ••• Hujusmodi ergo res proprie appellatur fundamentum relat;8nis in quocunque relationum genere.
Now it happens that in some relations over and above this
foundation some other condition is required to mediate between
the foundation and term, in some way distinct from both of them,
which will allow the relation to result.
69
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Contingit ••• in aliquibus relationibus,
ut praeter totam entitatem subjecti et
fundamenti requiratur ali qua alia conditio medians inter fundamentum et terminum, in re ipsa aliquo modo distincta
ab ipsis, ut possit inter ea consurgere
relatio. 7~

..

This necessary condition is the generative act in the relation
of paternity.

If a person were created immediately and entire w

1y by God as the sole efficient cause, no real relation of paternity would arise.

And yet this generative act is not strict-

ly the foundation, which Suarez describes as illud in quo et
a quo
---

proxime habet entitatem suam. 72

This necessary condition, for lack of a better name, is
frequently called the ratio fundandi of the relation.

Suarez

admits that the choice of words is not too fortunate, 73

for

ordinarily the term ratio is saved for something which exerts
some kind of causal influence on the being in question.

But

this necessary condition is a pure condition, removens prohibens,
and has no causal influence on the relation.
Suarez warns us that this is not to be ta.ken as a general
rule to be applied univocally to all relations.

Many founda-

tions contain within themselves the very ratio fundandi of the
relation and are in need of no. other necessary condi tion other
than themselves and a real term.
71 Ibid.
72 IOfa:
73 . Ibid;
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Naminter duo alba statim consurgit relatio similitudinis, a quocunque facta
•
sint, et ubicunque existant, aut quascunque alias conditiones habeant, et
idem est de relatione scientiae ad scibile et similibus. Et ita hujusmodi ratio fundandi, etiamsi hac voce illam
conditionem appellemus, non est necessaria in omnibus relationibus. 74
Suarez in order to avoid multiplying terms needlessly prefers to take ratio fundandi as the formal aspect of the foundation, that natural property or nature of the foundation that
makes it apt to found the relation.

In this sense he concludes
75
that there must be a ratio fundandi in every foundation.

The ratio and the foundation would not be really distinct, but
only rationally ao. 76
TERM OF A RELATION
The third and last elements of a relation is its term, the
being which terminates the relation and to which the subject is
referred.

Every predicamental relation demands a real term.
Dicendum ••• est, ad relationem praedicamentllem necessarium esse aliquem terminum realem ••• · Cum enim essentia ejus
sit ad aliud se habere secundum suum
esse essentiale, in hoc ipso includitur
terminus; cumque relatio haec praedicamentalis et realis sit, terminum ejus
realem esse necesse est. 77

Since the essence of a predicamental relation is ad aliud se
74
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the term, the aliud, is in some way included in the

..

If the relation is real, then the term also must be

real.
But need the term be not only real, but also actually exis
ing independently of the mind?

As Suarez showed above, such an.

actually existing term is not needed in the case of transcendental relations, which can be had either to pure possibles or even
to rationate beings.

What, then, is the peculiar nature of a

predicamental relation that Suarez should demand that it enjoy
an actually existing term?

One reason for calling the matter

in question is that just considering the relation and the term
of the relation precisely under its terminating function, the
relation does not seem to require any actual existence of the
term.

The relation takes its entity from its foundation. 79

So if there is an actual foundation, this would seem to suffice;
no actual term would be needed.
In spite of these difficulties Suarez demands a real term
actually existing independently of the mind for every real predicamental relation.

~e admits, as we said previously, that a

transcendental relation does

no~

have this same exigency, and

its term can either be a real being which can exist, but actually does not, or even a rationate being.
78
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••• relationes reales transcendentales,
esse posse ad terminos non solum non
eXistentes, verum etiam qui non sint
entia realia secundum essentiam. 80
The difficulty in proving the necessity of an actual term
is that practically all the arguments that are

~sually

brought

forward to prove this point should logically also apply to transcendental relations.

To say, for example, that no real being

includes in its notion a reference to a being which is not real,
is not true in a real transcendental relation;

or to claim that

since a relation is always had between two terms, those terms
must be real if the relation is to be real, and must be actual
if the relation is to be actual, leaves us in the same difficulty regarding transcendental relations. 81
On our quest, however, for arguments which will hold and
prove only for predicamental relations, we find this quotation
from Suarez:
••• relatio et terminus sunt simul tempore, et quod ablato correlativo seu
termino aufertur relatio, et quod posito termino, si iam supponitur fundamentum, consurgit relatio; ••• omnia vero
illa supponunt realem existentiam termini, nam includunt coexistentiam extremorum, ~uae supponit utriusque existentiam. 8
Another sturdy proof is this:

-----------------80
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a predicamental relation

78

consists essentially in a pure reference to the term# and exercises no

o~her

function.

It is not of itself intended by nature

or by any agent, but results over and above what the thing is
in itself according to its complete absolute nature.

From this

explanation it is clear that such a total reference could not be
had without the coexistence of the two terms# the foundation
and the term of the relation.

Without the term, the foundation

would remain in every respect an absolute.

It is only because

of the simultaneity of term that the referential aspect of the
foundation can be justified •
••• si relatio praedicamentalis in re non
est aliud nisi ipsummet fundamentum, ut
accidentaliter dans denominationem relativam, ergo non potest in re ipsa dare illam, nisi coexistente termino; nam omnis
alia denominatio aut erit omnino absoluta
et essentialis, et consequenter ad summum
erit respectiva transcendentaliter, aut
non erit denominatio ex solis ipsis rebus
sumpta, ~~d ex comparatione nostrae rationis.
These two arguments are valid even for those who place
some kind of real distinction between rela'tion and foundation,
but in the Suarezian pOSition they have even greater force.

For

if the predicamental relation is not really anything other than
the foundation itself, viewed as relative or referred to a term,
the foundation cannot really enjoy that denomination unless the
term is actually existing.
83

For every other denomination either
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.ould be absolute and essential, or would arise merely as a resuIt of a mental comparison.

..

Thus every predicamental relation

does demand a real term which is actually existing. 84
The arguments that are frequently brought to bear than an
sctual term is not necessary, are really valid only against the
actuality of the term of a transcendental relation.

An actual

term is needed in a predicamental relation precisely because it
is a pure reference which arises upon the coexistence of the
terms of that relationship.

So though it is true that an actual

termination does not add anything in the line of perfection to
the already existing term, nevertheless, the relation does presuppose that term as its object towards which it tends.
o •• terminum realem requiri ad relationem
praedicamentalem ex natura et modo talis
relationis, quae solum consistit in puro
respectu orto ex coexistentia extremorum.
Unde, licet verum,sit ipsam actualem terminationem nihil ponere in termino, tamen
necessario supponet entitatem in illo, accomodatam ut vx positione ejus cum termino possit insurgere relatio, et ut ipsa
relatio habeat quasi objectum in quod posrespicere. 85

But to return to a point we by-passed earlier.

Suarez has

already implied that the term is somehow of the essence of a relation.

Not all the authors are in agreement with him;

fact, some are almost violent in their denials.

in

Their reason

is that since the term is entirely outside of the relation and
84
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really distinct from it, it could not possibly be of its es-

..

Bence.
it. 86

Ehat is of the essence of a being must be intrinsic to
others claim just the opposite:

the term is of the es-

sence of a relation, since the entire essence is an ordination
to that term.
The dispute arises only through a confusion in terminology.
Everyone agrees that the term is not an intrinsic part, either
as a genus or specific difference, of a relation.

So the term

cannot be of the essence of a relation in this sense.
But at the same time a relation is a tendency or reference
to a definite term;

this is its essence.

So the term can in

some way be said to be included in the essence of the relation,
in the sense that the relation cannot be had without the term,
nor strictly, even be conceived without in some way including
the term within that concept.
Unde ••• dici potest includere aliquo
modo terminum in sua essentia, quia
non potest absolvi ab illo, neque
secundum propriam rationem concipi,
quin in tali conceptu terminus includatur. 87
To a certain extent this is true even of transcendental relations, for the forms or entities from whose essence they
spring cannot be defined adequately without including the term

------86
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to which they are related. 88

But for Suarez the difference

between the two is that a predicamental relation from its proper
and peculiar essence requires an actually eXisting term;

a

transcendental relation does not result from its term, properly
speaking, nor does it view that term precisely under the formal
aspect of term, but always in some way as an object, effect,
cause, etc. 89
Therefore, Suarez can write,
Atque ita est aliquo modo magis intrinseca et formalis habitudo ad terminum,
praesertim existentem, in relatione praedicamenta~b quam in respectu transcendentali.
Suarez insists that the necessity of this term is absolute.
Nihilominus tamen dicendum est non posse
per ullam potentiam conservari relationem
praedicamentalem ut sic sine suo actuali
termino. ~l.
The reason is that a term is somehow involved in the very formal
effect of a predicamental relation.

Since a predicamental re-

lation cannot actually exist without exercising its formal effect, and the formal effect includes a real and actual term,
then the relation demands with absolute necssity that actual
term.

No formal effect can ever be had unless all its essential

prerequisites are also given •
••• non posse relationem conservari in
rerum natura, quin actu exerceat suum
88
89
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effectum formalem; ergo non poteet
relatio actu conservari sine suo ter~
mino actuali •. 92
It is much easier to see how this term is necessary in the
suarezian position which identifies the relation with the foundation.

Without the coexistence of the term, the relative de-

nomination would not be had, but only the absolute foundation
with its absolute denomination.

So there is no question here

of how God can conserve one entity without also conserving some
other entity really distinct from the first.

For God can and

does conserve the foundation in existence without any other
term.

But He cannot conserve that foundation under its relative

aspect and denomination without an actual term, for the very
relative aspect of the foundation includes and involves the

ter~

Nulla enim hic intervenit entitas, quam
Deus non possit conservare sine alia
realiter distincta; nam totam entitatem fundamenti potest conservare sine
termino; non tamen potest conservare
illam entitatem sub tali ratione et denominatione, quia secundum illam involvit ipsum terminum; imo in re ipsa
nihil distinctum addlt, praeter coexistentiam termini. 93
This actual term of a relation must be really distinct from
the foundation of the relation, and so from the relation itself,
which is really identified with the foundation.'
Dicendum vero est, ad relationem realem
92
93
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necessarium esse ut fundamentum, et terminus formaliter sumptus, in re ipsa distinguantur. 94

Suarez thinks that the truth of this statement is evident.
Et quod requiratur aliqua distinctio in
re inter correlativa realia est fereggrincipium per se notum in metaphysica.
But if anyone demands proof for this statement, several
spring immed1a.tely from the metaphysical scene.
In mutual real relations the two relations are really distinct from one another, otherwise, they would be but two aspects
of one real relation.

But each of these relations is identical

with one of tpe terms, since a relation is not really distinct
from its foundation.

What is the foundation of one relation

will be the term of the other, and vice versa.

Therefore, if

one relation is distinct from the other, and the other relation
is identified with its own foundation, then, the first relation
will be really distinct from the foundation of the other, but
will have it as its term.

Thus, it is clear the relation would

be distinct from its term.
Nam correlativa censentur realiter opposita; non opponitur autem idem sibi ipsi;
oportet ergo ut correlativa in re aliquo
modo distinguantur. Unde necesse etiam
est relationes reales oppositas, esse in
re aliquo modo distinctas, tum propter oppositionem, tum etiam quia unaquaeque re94
95
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latio in re est idem cum suo extremo;
••• ergo si extrema sint distincta,
etiam relationes. Quocirca si relationis terminus est relatio opposita,
hinc satis concluditur relationem et
terminum deb ere in re esse distincta. 96

..

Also, not merely the two mutual relations should be really
distinct, but also the subjects of those relations;

for a real

relation cannot be had between terms which are not distinct.
For if there were really one, they would become two terms only
because of the intellect separating and comparing them, and the
consequent relations would be rational, not real. 97
Suarez says this real distinction between relation and
term, between foundation and term, need not be adequate, as
between two separate and separable things, but a modal or an
inadequate distinction, as between a whole and its part, would
be sufficient to maintain a real relation.
Breviter tamen censeo non esse necessarium aequalem in omnibus, sed juxta
naturam fundamentorum et modum relationum pensandum id esse •••• Saepe enim
haec distinctio debet esse realis et
suppositalis, ut in relatione patris
et filii; ••• Ad aliquas vero relationes
existimo sufficere distinctionem modalem;
nam, sicut est vero efficientia aut emanatio inter rem et mcdum, ita etiam potest
esse vera relatio. 98
The final question that arises regarding the term of a
96
97
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predicamental relation is wh.ether the term is the being to which
•
the subject is referred under its absolute nature, or in so far
as that being is relative.

The point is cardinal for a thorough

understanding of our problem •
••• est per se valde necessaria ad explicandam naturam relationis, -quae tum ex
fundamento~ tum ex termino, suo modo
pendet... 9
Suarez is speaking of the particular aspect of the term which
is necessary to terminate a relation.
Est autem advertendum, hic nos non agere
de formali denominatione termini, ut actu
terminantis, sed de ratione seu forma,
quae in ipsa re, quae est terminus, rrquiritur ut sit apta ad terminandum. 00
There are, in general, three schools of thought on this
subject.

The first group, with Cajetan as their leader, 101

maintain that in every relation

~he

formal term ought to be

relative.
Prima affirmat in omnibus relationibus,
tam mutuis quam non mutuis, formalem termlnum debere esse relativum. lOa
The second school comes forward with Ferrara 103
mand a distinction.

to de-

In mutual relations the term is relative,

while in relations which are not mutual, the term terminates
99
100
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under its absolute aspect.
Secunda sententia distinctione utitur,
nam de relationibua mutuis idem sentit
quod praecedens sententia ••• De non
mutuis autem affirmat termini~i ad absolutum et non relativum ••• u4
The third opinion, advanced by such men as Scotus 105 and
capreolus,106

contends that all relations, mutual as well as

non-mutual, terminate at an absolute.
Tertia sententia universaliter docet
omnes relationes, t~n mutuas quam non
mutuas~ terminari ad absolutum formaliter. lu7
Suarez himself decides to join forces with the third group
to hold that all relations terminate at an absolute. 108
divides his proof into two sections:

He

the first, for nonwmutual

relations, the second for mutual relations.
In non-mutual relations the real term cannot be another relation, corresponding to the first, but must be the absolute
entity, or an absolute property of the term.
Dico ergo primo: in relativis non mutuia ratio quae est in uno extremo ad
terminandam relationem alterius, non
est a11qua relatio opposita relationi
alterius, sed est ipsa terminus, vel
proprietas aliqua absoluta talis termini. 109

-

-"- -
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Tn8 proof is obvious, for in non-mutual relations the

r~al

re-

lation has a real and actual term which is not the basis or
foundation for another relation.

Therefore, the term cannot

terminate under a real relative aspect, since it simply does
not possess one;

it must terminate in so far as it is an s.bso-

••• haec relatio habet terminum realem et
realiter existentem; sed in illo termino
nulla existit re1atio rea1is correspondens
opposita alteri relationi; ergo il1e terminus non per relationem sed per aliquam
rem absolutam constituitur aptius ad terminandum. 110
.
As regards mutual relations, Suarez offers several proofs,
from which we shall briefly consider two. III

In a pair of

mutual relations each relation terminates at the foundation of
the other in so far as it is an absolute, for even, imagining
the impossible, if one of the two relations was withheld, if
the foundation were still intact, the first relation could still
fully terminate at that foundation •
••• nam si per impossibile in a1tero extremo impediretur relatio, conservato
toto fundamento ejus, nihilominus re1atio a1terius extremi posset ad 111ud
terminari; ergo signum est i119s duas
relationes esse simul per concomitantiam, et non per forma1em terminum unius
ad a1iam. lla
Suarez bases his second proof on an analysis of the philo110
III
112
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sophiC axiom which every philosopher admits that given the
4

foundation and term, a predicamental relation will reslllt.
These are the only requirements;
other relative or relation.

no mention is made of any

Therefore, Suarez concludes that

the term of a relation must be an absolute, not a corresponding
relation.
Secundo argumentor, quia COMmllne axioma
est, posito fundamento et termino, resultare relationem praedicamentalem, et non
alias; ergo terminus unius relationis
non potest esse relatio opposita. Antecedens certum est omnium consensu, et constat ex supra dictis de natura hujus relationis. 113
Thus we have seen with Suarez something of the nature of
the supreme genus of predicamenta1 relation.

But in the con-

crete, there are different kinds of predicamental relations.
Although all of them are similar in so far as they are a pure
reference to a term, yet all the various individual predicamental relations can be sub-divided into three species which fall
under the general genus we have been considering.

KINDS OF PREDICAMENTAL RELATION
In determining the various types of relations Suarez once
again takes his point of departure from Aristotle.
book of his Metaphysics,

In the fifth

Aristotle distinguishes three kinds

of relatives, specifically distinct, according to their three
113

.
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types of foundations.
Things are 'relative' (1) as double to
half, and treble to a third, and in general that which contains something else
many times to that which is contained
many times in something else, and that
which exceeds to that which is exceeded;
(2) as that which can heat to that which
can be heated, and that which can cut to
that which can be cut, and in general
the active to the passive; (3) as the
measurable to the measure, and the knowable to knowledge, and the perceptible
to perception. Il~
It is obvious why both Aristotle and Suarez chose the
foundations to be the distinguishing factor, for since the
foundation .- and it must be remembered that for Suarez relation
even owes its ontological unity to that foundation -- there
could be no clearer sign or clue to the distinction of relations
that the distinction of their formal foundations •
••• nam cum una ex potissimis causis relationis sit fundamentum ejus, tmo cum
ab eo habet entitatem suam, nullum potest esse majus indicium distinctionis
relationum quam distinctio fundamentorum ••• 1 i 5
In brief, Suarez's ar@unent, though he does not put it precisely
in this way, is this.
tion.

Relation has its being from its founda-

But being and unity are convertible.

has its unity from its foundation.

Therefore, relation

As the species of the

dations differ, so differ the species of relations.

-----------114
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The remote subject of relation is not of equal value in
determining this distinction, since it is further removed from
the relation in question.
Nam fundamentum remotum vel potius subjectum non ita per se concurrit ad relationem, et ideo distinctio ejus non est
ita sufficiens fundamentum ad distinguendas relationes. 116
At first consideration, it might have seemed better to distinguish relations according to their terms, since relations
are ordination or references to those terms:
being the specifying factor in each case.

the term then

Suarez admits that

this would be true if one is speaking of some basis, even though
remote, for the distinction of relations.

But the fundamental

and telling distinction had best be taken from something more
immediately proximate.
Reapondetur ••• id esse verum de distinctione specifica et ultima; distinctionem vero genericam seu sub alteram, posse aliunde sumi. 117
Also, the Aristotelian basis of distinction does not completely overlook the diversity of terms, but in some way includes them, at least, implicitly.

Since the relation is pre-

ciselya reference to another, which other, scl., the term, must
be real and of such a nature as to terminate the relation, it
is clear that the nature of the term will in its own right pro116
117
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portionately determine the relation, even if one makes the
foundation itself the formal determinate.
Secundo respondetur, in ilIa distinctione
non esse praetermissos terminos formales,
sed vel expresse, vel saltem implicite
significatos esse in illis tribus generibus. 118
The adequacy of the division Suarez says has never been
called into question, 119

but we shall take up this in passing

in the critique in the last chapter.

Suarez quotes with approv-

al Alexander of Hales's defense of the three-fold division on
the ground that they are regulated by the "three universal modes
of being":

identity and diversity, act and potency, the per-

ject and the imperfect.
Aliam rationem hujus differentiae indicat
eodem loco Alexander Alensis, dicens illam
divisionem sumptam esse ex tribus modis
universalibus entis, qui sunt idem ac diversum, quoad primum; potentia et actus,
quoad secundum; et pel~8ctum et imperfectum, quoad tertium •••
The latter division of perfect and imperfect does present difficulties immediately, for it would seem to be reducible in
some way to the second category of potency and act, since potency as a capacity for perfection, implies of its nature a state
of imperfection, while by act we mean nothing other than perfection.
118
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of Alexander of Hales, the Doctor Irrefragabilis.

The relation

existing between sense faculty and its sensible object is not
as the imperfect to the perfect, but only as that which is
measurable to that which is the measure, the specifying term,
which can either be more perfect, equally perfect, or less perfect than the sense knowledge.

As a consequence of this dif-

ficulty Alexander of Hales stated without proving this threefold division as the basis for the division of

foundation~.

Deinde, quamvis asserat illos tres modos
sufficienter dividere fundamenta relationum, non tamen rationem sufficientiae reddit, neque ex vi illius explicationis declarat dis~inctionem eorum inter see 121
In the last analysis, Suarez harkens back to Aristotle as
his authority for the divisions of relational foundations and
leaves the argument there.
ty, nothing more.

His distinction is based on authori-

Suarez argues that Aristotle must have ar-

rived at such a division from some kind of inductive process by
which he found that there was no relation that could not be re.
duced to one of these three heads:
Existimo ergo nullam aliam rationem sufficientiae Aristotelem habuisse, praeter
inductionem quamdam, qua intellexit nullam inveniri relationem, quae ad aliquod
ex dictis capitibus revocari non possit ••• 122
Suarez's stand remains here;

he goes no further, except to jus-

tify his stand with a consideration of the entire gamut of ob121
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jections and difficulties, as is his wont, which can be hurled
at his "divisional" position.
As we saw above, Suarez places all relations which ultimately stem from unity or multiplicity into his first classifica
tion of relations, which he later subdivides into various subspecies.

Relations of equality, similarity, and specific iden-

.

tity are grouped together as having their relational basis in
unity:
have

~

things are similar which have one quality; equal which
quant:t ty; specifically the same which have one speci-

fic substance or essence:
•• ~nam in unitate ••• fundari aequalitatem, similitudinem, et in universum
identitatem eorum quorum una est substantia. Nam similia dicuntur, quae
habent unam qualitatem; aequalia quae
habent unam quantitatem; eadem vero,
quae habent unam substantiam, quod potest intelligi vel propria et in rigore
de substantia, vel generatim de essentia ••• 123
Other relations are based or founded on number or multiplicity: those which are related in quantity, and yet do not
enjoy a strict unity, such as multiple, excessive, double, triple, etc.:
In numero vero ••• fundari omnes relationes quae aliquo modo secundum quantitatem dicuntur, et ab unitate recedunt,
ut sunt omnes proportiones inter numeros
inaequales ••• 124
123
124
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Relations of dissimilarity, distinction, etc., Suarez also plac
r •
under this first heading, for they too are in some way based on
number, since distinction implies difference, difference implies
multiplicity, while multiplicity implies unities:
Atque ••• ad idem fundamentum pertinent relationes omnes dissimilitudinis, distinctionis, et similes, quia in numero aliquo
modo fundantur; hic enim non sumuntur in
rigore unitas et numerus pro quantitate,
sed generalius. 125
Whenever Aristotle speaks of relations of this type he always
speaks of them in the plural, for they are always mutual relations. 126
In the second group Suarez, following Aristotle, places relations which are founded on an active or passive potency, or
in actions flowing from them, e.g., the power of heating and
the power of being heated;

actually heating and actually hot:

In secundo genere ponit Aristoteles ea
relativa quae fundantur in potentia agendi et patiendi, vel in actionibus earum •••
Et adhibet exempla, ut calefactivum et
calefactibile, calefaciens et calefactum. 127
But Suarez makes two clarifications of Aristotle's position
in the fifth book of his Metaphysics.

First, when Aristotle

places a real relation between a potency and a possible, he is
not speaking of a possible effect taken objectively, as some
125
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have thought;

rather, he is speaking of a passive potency which

'" the action.
can receive
o •• cum Aristote1es ponit re1ationem
rea1em inter potentiam et possibi1e,
nunquam loqui de effectu possibi1i
objective sumpto... Aristote1es autem aperte loquitur de potentia passiva seu subjecto cA1efactibi1i ••• 128

Secondly, it is one thing to be the real term of a relation of

.

an active potency, as actually acting or causing efficiently,
and another to be the term of an active potency, abstracting
from the action.itse1f.

The latter term is a passive potency;

otherwise, it could not be a. real term.

The former is the ef-

fect itself as flowing from the agent •
••• a1ium esse terminum rea1em re1ationis potentiae activae ut sic abstrahendo
ab actione, a termino potentiae activae
ut subest actioni, seu ut facientis... 129
This relation o,f an active potency as actually acting can be
had according to differences in time:

either in a present ae-

tion, as a builder actually building, to his building; or in a
past action, as,in the relation of paternity;

or even in a

future action,
••• hanc relationem, quae fundatur in potentia Bub actione, variari juxta varias
temporis differentias: alia enim fundatur in praesenti actione ••• a1ia in actione praeterita ••• et alia in actione futura, ut quod facturum est ad id quod
faciendum ••• 130
128
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The third

cla~s

or relatives consists in those which are

..

based on some way on "measure," -- mensurabilis ad mensuram,
as the relation knowledge has to the thing known, or the intellect to its intelligible object.

A profound difference is to

be noted between relations of this third type and ttiose of the
first two.
lationship;

The first two types of relations imply a mutual rethose of the third type are not mutual •
••• in prioribus ••• utrumque relativum dicitur ad aliquid, quia idipsum, a quo
unumquodque est, aliud dicitur, et non
quia aliud ad ipsum; at vero 1n tertio
genere, 11cet unum relativorum dicatur
ad aliquid, quia vere est ad aliud, alterum vera, quod il11 correspondet, non
dicitur ad aliud quia vere sit ad aliud,
,sed quia aliud est ad ipsum. 131

Thus in the case of knowledge, knowledge is related to its
known object, yet the object is said to be known, not because
it has a real relation to the knowledge, but because the knowledge has a real relation to it.
Relative terms which imply number of potency, therefore, are all relative because their very essence includes in its
nature a reference to something else, not
because something else involves a reference to it; but tbat which is measurable
or knowable or thinkable is called relative because something else involves a
reference to it. 132
We have now seen in a general way something of Suarez's insight into the nature of predicamental relations.
131
132
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The task be-

97
fore us is to stand back and to see this position in metaphysical perspective in order to evaluate Suarez's stand on this
basic ontological question.
chapter.

This we shall do in the following

CHAPTER

IV

A CRITIQUE OF SUAREZ'S DOCTRINE ON RELATIONS
We have thus seen through many pages Suarez's ideas on the
nature of a predicamental relation.

Our question now is to

what extent he is correct in his analysis and in his conclusion
But any analysis or any sey of conslusions presupooses certain
philosophical doctrines which act as premises and as a point of
departure for all the rest of a man's thought.

It is ridiculous

to begin and end merely with some doctrinal fragment, torn from
the total complex of a philosopher's thought.

If he has reason-

ed, B.nd reasoned logically, to certain conclusions on a particular point, we cannot merely take those conclusions in isolation.
We must trace them back over the paths of thought to their ontological and epistemological sources.

It has been said of

Kant that once one grants him his initial premises, one must
also agree with him on the total remainder of his critical enterprise. 1
sopher.
world. 2

To a certain extent this is true of every philo-

Give Aristotle act and potency and he will explain the
Grant St. Thomas creation and he will explain the

universe. 3

This is obvious hyperbole, but I have put it with

-- -------- ------1
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deliberate provocativeness in order to emphasize the point I
am trying to make.

To understand and accept or reject Suarez's

doctrine on relations, we must understand and equally accept
or reject his first metaphysical beginnings.
But we shall not start from those beginnings;

we shall

not begin with the concept of being and watch its unravelling
in one direction until it unfolds in an explanation of predicamental relation.

Rather, we shall begin with relation and trace

it back to its source in being.
As we stated in our intromlction, our principal concern in
this last chapter is with ontological truth:

not what Aristotle

said, not what St. Thomas or Suarez held merely because they
held such positions;

but what does reason itself say in think-

ing out reality.
If we begin with the problem of relation itself, it is essential that we see it precisely as a problem.

A solution is

no solution at all unless we clearly grasp the problem to which
it is a solution.
The core of our present problem is this:

we know with full

certitude that the various ebings which constitute reality are
inter-related.

They are really related to each other.

what causes them to be related?

Now

in virtue of what can we say

that two belngs are really similar, that one being is really de-

r,--------------~
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pendent upon another, that a father is really related to his

..

son and the son to his father?
what makes them related?

If they are really related,

The answer is real relations.

Thus far there is no difficulty_

The difficulty arises

when we seek the intimate nature and explanation of those real
relations.

~n

explaining their nature, we must not explain

them in such a way as to destroy either their reality or their
relativity.

In, the two possible courses open to us, we find

that one of the two elements would seem to be weakened.

If we

emphasize the reality of relations by plaving a real distinction between them and their foundations, then there is the danger of making them absolutes, entities with their own act of
existence, super-added to the absolute quantified, qualified
substance.

A relation becomes another aliquid, rather than an

ad ali quid, the least of the intrinsic predicaments as regards
entity.

Thus in affirming their reality, we seem to weaken, if

not destroy, their relativity.
But if we take the second course open to us, and emphasize
the utter and radical relativity of relations by claiming a
rational distinction between relation and foundation, with relation being a mere fragile connotation, the least of the predicaments, we seem to destray the reality of relations by making them merely rationate beings.
This is our antinomy;

this our problem:

to keep relations
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real and relational.

With the problem in hand, let us work

..

toward a solution.
Predicamental relations are real; 4

ty of themselves.

they have their reali-

Independently of the mind things are really

related among themselves.

These relations are not of the es-

sences of things, which are absolutes, but are really added to
the absolutes as real accidents.

Each relation, as an intrin-

sic accident, is a principle of being, an ens entis. 5

In so

far as that being is an accident, its existence will be that
of accidental existence:

iness~,

-- for in every being there

is a proper proportion between its essence and its act of existence.
• •• in aliis autem relationibus in creaturis existentibus, est aliud esse relationis et substantiae quae refertur,
et ideo dicuntur inesse, et secundum
quod insunt compositionem faciunt ad
subjectum ••• 6
In so far as it is a finite being, it will not have its act of
ancidental existence from its very essence, but will be a being
composed of two really distinct principles, essence and existence.

Any finite being, whether substance or accident, is a

composite of essence and existence.

The essence of any crea-

ture, adequately conceived, does not include existence within
its formal content.

To know existence an analysis of essence

------.---4
5
6

Aquinas, de Pot., q. 7, a. 9.
De Ver., q. ''Z7;-a. 1, ad 8.
~~n~~, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1.
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is not enough;

one must proceed to a completely new act, the

..

judgment, where the act of existence is formally known and af,firmed.
Esse enim subsistens, non potest esse
nisi unum... Oportet ergo, quod quaelibet alia res sit ens participative,
ita quod aliud sit in eo substantia
partlcipans esse et aliud ipsum esse
participatum. 7
This applies to any finite being.
that by which it is what it is.

The essence of a relation is
But a relation in the order of

essence totally consists in a reference to another: ad aliquid
or esse ad.
Ea vero quae dicuntur ad aliquid significant secundum propriam rationem solum
respectum ad a11ud. 8
Therefore, the essence of a relation can be expressed as esse
ad.

The existence of predicamental relation is that by which

it is. But the existence of any accident is to be in a subject:
esse in. 9

Predicamental relation is an accident.

Therefore,

the existence of a predicamental relation will be to inhere in
a subject:

~

in.

Et similiter licet ad allquid non signlficetur ut inhae~ens, tamen oportet ut
sit inhaerens. 10
Thus, every real predicamental relation will be composed of
these two elements:

esse ad and esse in.

Dicendum quod ipsa relatio quae nihil est
7

~odl.,

8

S. T., I, q. 28, a. 1.

9
10

III, a. 20.

In V--Meta., lect. 9, n. 894; lect. 22, n. 1139.
P~ti;-q. 8. a. 2.

ag
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aliud quam ordo unius creaturae ad
aliam, aliud habet in quantum est
accidens, et aliud in quantum est
relatio vel ordo. In quantum accidens est, habet quod sit in subjecto, non autem in quantum est relatio vel ordo; sed solum quod ad
aliud sit quasi in aliud transiens,
et quodammodo rei relatae assistens.
Et ita relatio est aliquid inhaerens,
licet non ex hoc ipso quod est rela ..
tio. l~
There are some Thomists who, while maintaining a real distinction between finite essence and existence, wtill hold that
the essence of a real predicamental relation contains two aspects of one reality which is the relation itself:
and the esse in.

the esse ad

They claim that since relation, unlike the

other accidents, does not of its nature commit itself to be
either real or rational, 12

the essence of a relation becomes

real by including within itself the note of inherence, esse in.
For, as Cardinal Billot writes,
Sed cave ne concipias haec duo tamquam
se habentia ad invicem eo modo quo potentia se habet ad actum, puta essentia ad esse, non secus ac si esse ad
significaret essentiam relationis realis, et esse in ejus existentiam. Hoc
enim verum-non-est, quia esse aliquid
cui competit existere in subjecto, profecto ingreditur essentiam relationis
realis in quantum realis est.... Unde
consulto dixi distinguendas esse duas
notas id esse duos inadequatos aspectUB unius simplicia atque incompoaitae
11 Ibid., q. 7, a. 9, ad 7.
12guodl., IX, 4.
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13

essentiae realis, quae tota est ad et
tota in, tametsi, conceptus ad, ex hoc
quod QIcit ad, non involvit conceptum
in, qui solus est ratio realitatis in
TIs quae dicuntur ad alterum. Quippe
esse ad non explicat rationem entis
realiB; nisi quia et in quantum est in
sUbstantia vel per inhaerentiam vel
per identitatem. 13

L. Card. Billot, S.J., De Deo Uno et Trino, Commentarius in
Primam Partem S. Thomae-,-ea:-7a;-in-Univ. Gregoriana, Romae,
1926, 409. Some Thomists 'who tenaciously hold the real distinction between finite ess·ence and existence quote Card.
Billot on this point with approval. It is because they conceive of relation as really distinct from the foundation,
but as not adding any new entitative perfection to the subject. The clearest and most detailed exposition of this
view has been presented in, an historical study of "St. Thomas's Theory of the Causes of Relation," by Clifford G. Kossel, in The Modern Schoolman, st. Loui's Univ., St. Louis,
NOv., 1946, 19.-36; Jan. 1947, 93-107; March 1948, 151-172.
In the course of these articles Kossel writes:
First, granted the existence of the subject
with the foundation of relation (in this case
quantity), the subject acquires a new relation without intrinsic addition or change.
Secondly, before there is an actual relation,
the subject by its foundation has an indeterminate and virtual relativity. This is the
root and esse of the relation; by the possession or-tnis quantity, I am capable of being equal to all who have the same quantity.
Thirdly, the actual relation arises when there
is a term which determines this indeterminate
relativity of the root. Finally, the real
esse of relation, and hence its reality as an
Innerent accident, derives from the root and
is entirely independent of the term in its
being. (March 1948, 158)
According to this explanation there is but one'physical form
which is the source of quantity, the virtual relativity, and
relation in act. (158) This is not explicitly, at least,
the same as Suarez's doctrine. With Suarez, relation is
only rationally distinct from the foundation; in the Billot-Kossel theory, relation is really distinct from the
foundation, but is not a new physical form added over and
above the foundation. Suarez's position logically leads to
the conclusion that predicamental relation is only fundamentally in things, formally in the mind; for the second
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I do not believe that this is correct.

-_.- -------

It is not necessary

..

school, predicamental relation is formally in reality, but
is nothing other than the simultaneous coexistence in being
and intelligibility of the two terms of the relation. This
unity of the two is real although it does not add anything
entitatively to either of the terms. This real unity can
be grasped and forged into a concept by an act of comparison of the two real terms and uniting them within one species.
In this explanation, however, it would seem that every
relation would be mutual, for if the relation itself is the
unity of the two, then, if one subject is related to the
other, then the other partaking equally in the unity of
simultaneity and existence would also be really related to
the first subject. It is doubtful, however, whether the
proponents of this theory would admit a real mutual predicamental relation between God and creature, for example, or
between an act of knowledge and its material object. (I do
not say formal object, since the relation would be transcendental of faculty and nature of act to its formal object, but intend merely anything that would fall- under the
general formal object and would not specify the faculty or
nature of the act in question.)
Although this theory does not appeal explicitly to a
connotation of subject to term as an explanation of relatio~
and so explicitly avoids the difficulties pressing against
Suarez's theory, nevertheless, it still must face the dif.
ficulty of explaining how this accident of relation does
not seem to inhere in any particular subject and yet partakes of the nature of accident; it would seem to differ
very little from the examples of the day which Plato appeals
to in his Parmenides (131 B 4-7) in attempting to explain
the participation of individuals in the forms. There does
not seem to be any reason for saying it is any more an accident of one being than it is an accident of another, unless one would appeal to the Suarezian connotation. And
while Billot-Kossel hold that it is in a subject only in so
far as the foundation is in the subject, since the actuality of relation does not add any new entitative perfection
to the subject over and above that of the foundation, it
would seem that the only accidental perfection really distinct from the subject would be the foundation. This# however, is admittedly an absolute. nence, the distinction
between foundation and relation would seem to coincide with
the rational distinction posited by Suarez, and the relative entity would be destroyed by a real identity with an
absolute.

r __--------------------------------~
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to include esse in within thelssence of a pred.icamenta1 re1a-

•

tion to make it real. 14

Relillon of itself can be either real

or rational depending on wbetMr or not the foundat:i on is real
of rational.

15

But though tlliconcept of relation as such

does not imply a real or

r~bQ

reference, it is not neces-

sary to go outside the essenclof predicamenta1 relation to find
the reality of any particulanll.1 relation.
is an analogous concept to

be!~plied

Relation as such

analogously to real re1a-

t.ions and rational relatioTIS 1lccidenta1 and divine relations .16
14

15
16

F. X. Maquart, ElementaJ~ll()sophiae, Andreas Blot, Paris,
1938, 186-187. .
_.
Aquinas, S. T., I, q. 2B 1i.l; de Pot., q. 7, a. 11.
SUrdl., IX, 4. "SciendUJut quodi"i11iOc differt "ad Qli~:
qu (il'"ab aliis generibus 1100. alia genera ex propria sui
ratione habent quod aliqullsint; sicut quantitas ex hoc
ipso quod est quantitas Bl!~Qid ponit; et similiter est
de aliis; sed "ad ali~Wex propria sui §eneris ratione
non habet quod est aliqllj~, sed" ad ali quid ; unde lnveniuntur quaedam "ad aliquidl~Qae nihil sunt in rerum natura,
sed in ratione tantum; qullin allis generibus non contin ...
gi t: et quamvis "a.d aliquEI ex ratione sui generia non
habeat quod ponat aliquid; non tamen etis.m habet ex ipsa
generis ratione quod nih.il~mat; quia ,sic nulla re1atio
esset aliquld in rerum n8:~a; unde "ad aliquid" non esset
unum de decem generibus. 1I
The analogy of the cl~~ept of relation as auch can be
drawn from the ideas prelilt in this paragraph. 1) Relation
as such, unlike the othertpedicaments, can be either real
or rational; some relat11~i exist independently of the
mind, other exist only In:ne mind. 2) But to exi at in the
mind is not the same as~uist in reality,. for a real being enjoys real existence1i rationate being enjoys intentional existence. "Specb~telligibi1is est simi1itudo
ipsius essentiae rei et er,podammodo ipsa quidditas et natura rei secundum esse intllligibi1e, non secundum esse naturale prout est in rebus,' Quod1., VIII, a. 4. Therefore,
the concept of relation wtlnapplied to real and rational
relations is applied partljin the same sense, partly in a
different sense. The ~ III~id or esse ad is common to
both types of relation, bmtheir respective acts of existence differ. Thus, relatlln is an analogous concept.
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Predicamental relation is real from its essence and from that

..

essence implies a proportion to the existence of an accident,
inesse. 17

To claim that the actual existence is contained

within the essence of a predicamental relation is to deny, in
at least one instance, -- and therefore, why not in every instance? -- the real distinction between finite essence and exi8tence.
This position would seem in the last analysis, as we have
indicated in a previous note, to be reducible to that of Suarez.
If the reference to a term
reference to the subject

(~_ ~d)

(!!~~

is identified with the

in), then the complete and essen-

tial relativity of relation, cuJus totum
habere, 18

~~ ~st

ad aliud se

would seem to be destroyed.

The essence,

~

ad, of the predicamental relation is

really distinct from the essence of the foundation.
dation of any relation is always an absolute, 19

The foun-

for no rela-

tion can be the ba.sis or foundation of another relation.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod relationes ipsae non referuntur ad aliud per aliam re~
lationem sed per se i~5as, quia essentialiter relationes sunt. .
The reason

fo~

this is obvious.

If the total essence of a re-

lation is an ordination to another, then it does not require
Summa contra Gentiles, IV, c. 14, ad 9.
Jonn" of st. Thomas, Oursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Marietti, Taurini, 1930. Vol. I, Log. II, P.Q~ XVII, art a, 579.
19 Ibid., 591 b 10.
20 De Pot!., q. 7, a. 9, ad 2.

17
18
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any other relation to make it relative.
referential;

Of its nature it is

another relation added to this would be superflu-

ous and would lead us into an infinite series:
Nec iterum una relatio refertur ad aliam per aliquam aliam relationem, cum
enim dioimus quod~paternitas opponitur
filiationi oppositio non est relatio
media inter paternitatem et filiationem. Quia utroque modo r~latio multiplioaretur in infinitum •

.

So if the essenoe of every foundation is an absolute, while
the essenoe of every predicamental relation is not in any sense
absolute, but entirely relational, then it follows that the essenoe of the foundation and hhe essenoe of a relation cannot be
really identified, but must be really distinot. 22
Nor oan the act of existence of a predioamental relation
be identified with the act of existence of the foundation. For
in every being a proportion is set up between the two prinoipIes of being, essenoe and existenoe. 23

If two essenoes are

radioally different, their respective acts of existenoe will
also be different. 24

Since the essence of a relation cannot

be the same as the essence of its absolute foundation, neither
oan the existence of a relation be really identified with the
aot of existence of the foundation, though, as accidents, both

-

al
22

23
24

S. T., I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 4.
R6gis Jolivet, Traite de Philosophie, Emmanuel Vitte, Paris,
1946, III, 298.
C. G., IV, o. 14.
johri of St. Thomas, I, 513 b 19.25.
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will have an existence which is inesse.

..

To deny this real distinction of relation and foundation
is to equate the two.

One must consequ·ently reduce the rela-

tion to an absolute, or make the foundation a relation.

But

since the foundation is the cause of a relation, it enjoys a
priority of nature to the relation which is as an effect. 25
So one would be forced to take the former alternative and make
relation an absolute.

If a r,elation is in any respect or to

any degree an absolute, in that respect B.nd to that degree it
ceases to be a relation.
And even if the founds.tion were reduced to the relation,
this would not help things;

for as we mentioned above, no re-

lation can be founded upon a relation.

If the foundation were

a relation, it could not be the foundation of the relation.
For, as Jolivet writes,
II semble cependant que 1 'opinion affirmative, c'est-A-dire distinguant reellement
la relation d'avec son fondement, soit la
plus plausible, car ell~ revient simplement a constater cette evidence que si Ie
fondement n'est pas uniquement absolu,
c'est-a-dire une chose donnee en soi, mais
aussi relatif, il ne peut l'etre que par
une autre realite que celle qui le constitue en l-g.i-meme. i:::6
Suarez explicitly admits that the predicamental relation

----_._--- -25
26

S. Thomae Aquinatis, Opusculum de Ente et Essentia, ed. by
Charles Boyer, S.J., apud Univ.-areg., Romae, 1933, c. 7.
Jolivet, III, 298.
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is an absolute form, but an absolute form in so far as it con-

..

notes a term:
••• esse in re formam absolutam, non tamen
absolute sumptam, sed ut respicientem aliam, quam d~9ominatio relativa includit seu
connotat.
Therefore, the whole reality of predicamental relation as such
would seem to consist precisely in this connotation of term.
Suarez himself nowhere in his treatment of predicamental relation analyzco in detail this notion of connotation.

But we can

"ask him several questions, suggested by Father Rugon, which
bring the point in full focus:
Quid sit connotatio termini, transcendentalis an praedicamentalia? Quid sit etiam
esse accidentale quod fundamento a~~itur,
ali quid logicum an aliquid reale?
Is this connotation of term a transcendental or a predicamental reference to a term?

If it is

transc~ndental,

ariSing

as a radical reference to a term, then the absolute foundation
can never lose such a reference.

It is obvious from many exam-

pIes which Suarez has granted, that the 8.bsolute foundation
can exist without any real reference.
tion cannot be transcendental.

Therefore, the connota-

But even granting that it were

transcendental, this transcendental connotation would not be a
predicamental relation, that is, a relation which would constitute a distinct predicament, a distinct classification of being.
a7
28

Suarez, d. 47, so 2, n. 22.
A. R. P. Eduardus Hugon, O. P., Cursus Philosophiae Thomisticae, P. Leth1elleux, Parisiis, 1928. Vol. III, 590.
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There would be no such thing as a predicamental relation. Suarez
nowhere even hints that he would be content with this
tive.

•

alterna~

In fact, he is emphatic in claiming that over and above

transcendental relations, there exist relations which constitute a distinct predicament. 29
But if this connotation of term is not a transcendental
reference, it must be predicamental.

If it is predicamental,

then we ask further what is this new accidental reference which
is added to the absolute foundation.

Is this new additional

connotation something real or is it merely rational?

If the

connotation is something real, then Suarez must admit that it
is a real addition and is really distinct from the foundation
to which it is added.

If the connotation is real and was not

present to the foundation before the existence of the actual
term, then that connotation must make a real composition with
the foundation.
It is clear that st. Thomas wanted a real composition of
substance and relation:
••• in aliis autem relationibus in creaturis existentibus, est aliud esse relationis et substantiae quae refertur, et
ideo dicuntur inesse, et secundum quod
insunt compositionem faciunt ad subjectum ••• 30
This could be had through the composition of substance and foun29
30

Suarez, d. 47, s. 4, n. 16.
In I ~ent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1.

lIz'
dation, even though the relation were identified with that

..

foundation.

But one must remember that the foundation really

pre-exists the actuality of relation;

thus any new perfection

will make real composition with both substance and foundation.
Eut a real composition demands real components, really distinct.
If this predicamental connotation is not real, but logical,
then there are no such entities as real relations, but only rational relations which exist in an intellect considering those
absolute foundations under a. relative aspect.

But Suarez main-

tains throughout his discussion that predicamental relations
are real.

Their reality can only be maintained if one grants

a real distinction between them and their foundations.
Suarez seems to want the act of a.ccidental existence, in~,

to be the guarantee of the reality of relations.

In the

course of the discussion in which he identifies the esse ad and
the

~ ~n

of a predicamental relation, he says that if a rela-

tion is to be real, then it must either exist in itself (en~
or in a subject (ens ~n alio). 31
It is true that
the act of existence is that by which the relation actually
exists in the real order.

But the real relation enjoys that

actual existence only because the essence with a real priority
of nature implied a real aptitude for such an existential act. 32
31
32

Suarez, d. 47, s. 2, n. 24.
John of st. Thomas, I, 512 b 26"31.
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The reason why Suarez rejects the
tion is

beca1~se

~ ad-~

in distinc-

he rejects the real distinction between crea-

ture essence and existence.

For, as Maquart writes,

Item apparet quomodo, deficiente termino,
cessat relation: "denominatio relativa includit aliquo modo terminum, sine quo non
manet actualiter, sed fundamenta!!ter tantum seu in proxima aptitudine."
Sed
haec tenere non potest nisi quia, propter
negationem distinctionis realis inter esaentiam et esse, debet essentia realis relationis sumi relate ad ease quod est in
subjecto: unde sequitur relationem "esse
in re formam aliguam absolutam ••• respicientem aliam" ••• 34
For Suarez the essence and existence of any finite being
are identified, distinct only in an intellect which separates
the two elements:
Dicendum ergo est, eamdem rem esse essentiam et existentiam, concipi autem sub ratione essentiae, quatenus ratione ejus conetituitur res sub tali genere et specie ••••
At vero haec eadem res concipitur sub ratione existentiae, quatenus est ratio essendi in rerum natura et extra causas. 35
Therefore, the essence of a predicamental relation as a real accident will also be identified with its act of existence.

The

whole essence of a relation as an order to something outside
the subject will be really identified with the act of accidental existence which is an order to the subject of inherence.
The foundation of a relation as an absolute accident is com33
34
35

Suarez, d. 47, s. ~, n. 23.
Maquart, III-2, 186.
Sllarez, d. 31, s. 6, n. 23.

114

pletely orientated to its substantive subject; for, as st. Thom-

..

as sa.ys,
Si consideremus propriam rationem cujus~
libet generis, quodlibet aliorum generum,
praeter ad aliquid, importat imperfectionem; quantitas enim habet propriam rationem in comparatione ad subjectum; est
enim quantitas mensura substantiae, qualitas dispositio sus~tantiae, et sic patet
in omnibus aliis.
Therefore, if Suarez identifies the order to a term which
is the essence of a relation with the order to the subject which
is the existence of an accidental relation, then it is not difficult to understand how he can hold that the entire relation,
essence and existence are identified with the foundation which
likewise implies a reference to its subject.
esse ad terminum

:

~

in subjecto.

But the foundation totally
Therefore,

~

ad

termin~~

:

~

:

in subjecto.

the foundation.

To push the question back still further, the ultimate basis
for Suarez's denial of the real distinction.between creature essence and existence is his concept of being.

_._ _---

Fundamentum distinctionis rationis inter
essentiam et esse ••• est essentia prout
pra.escindit ab actuali existentia, quae
proinde nec essentia actualis, nec possibIlis. 37

..

36
37

In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 3.
Maquart, IIIM2, 89.
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Suarez in forming the concept of being forms a concept

•

which represents all individual beings under a certain unity
which they possess.

It represents all the inferiors which veri-

fy being precisely in so far as they agree in

being~

in so far

as they are similar:
Necesse est conceptum formalem entis habere
aliquod aggregatum objectum; ••• ergo oportat ut ille conceptus sit unus secundum aliquam convenientiam et similitudinem entium
inter see :58
••• omnia entia realia vere habent aliquam
similitudinem et convenientiam in ratione
essendi; ergo possunt concipi et repraesentari sub ea praecisa ratione qua inter
se conveniunt; ergo possunt sub ea ratione unum conceptum objectivum constltuere;
ergo ille est conceptus objectivus entis. 39
Although the individual beings really differ in the real order,
the Suarezian concept of being does not include the essential
modes or differences of the inferiors.
conceptus entis objectivus praecisus est
ab omni ratione particulario Dico secundo: hic conceptus objectivus est secundum rationem praecisu8 ab omnibus particularibus, seu membris dividentibus ens,
etiam si sint maxime simplices entitates.
Haec conclusio videtur mihi necessaria •••
quia, cum omnia entia determinata ali quomodo dividentia ens sint inter se distincta, et plura objective, non possunt
intelligi convenire in unum objectivum
conceptum, nisi saltem secundum rationem
fiat praecisio et abstractio a pro pri!8
rationibus, in quibus distinguuntur.
Thus the concept of being in abstracting from the differen-

-------38 Suarez, d.

2~

39
40

Ibid., n. 14.
IbId., n. 15.

s. 2, n. 8.
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tiating modes of the inferiors, includes neither the modes of
substance nor of accident.

Ex his infero primo, in hoc conceptu entis objectivo et sic praeciso, non includi actu modos intrinsecos substantiae,
4
vel aliorum membrorum quae dividunt ens. 1
Since the concept of being does not include the

e~sential

modes

of differences within its comprehen3ion, neither does it inelude the inferiors themselves, for the differences as essential
modes, are the entity of the inferiors.

If the modes are con-

tained within being only potentially, not actually, 42

then

one can likewise conclude that the inferiors of being are contained within the concept of being only in potency.

This al-

lows Suarez to make the statement:
'Cum autem negatur esse de essentia creaturae actu existere sumenda est creatura
ut abstrahit seu praescindit a creatura
creata et creabili, cujus essentia objective concepts abstrahit ab actuali esse
aut entitate, et hoc modo negatur esse
de essentia ejus actu exi.stere, quia non
clauditur
conceptu ejus essentiali sic
praeciso.

42

The radical reason for this de-existentializing method in
treating the concept of being is that Suarez throughout his discussion of being remains entirely within the first operation of
the mind, the simple apprehension.

He does not go on to know

real existence in the judgment, the real existence which dyna41

42~

43

Ibid., n. 21.
Ibid.
!bid., d. 31, s. 6, n. 24.
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mizes the concept of being itself. 44

•

Precisely because of this essentialist approach to being,45
Suarez does not hold the real distinction between creature essence and existence.

Because of his stand on finite essence

and existence, he holds the real identification of relation and
foundation, reducing both in the last analysis to an absolute.
A real distinction between a relation and its foundation,
however, does not make relation in any wayan absolute.

In

fact, as we have just seen, to take the opposite course and to
identify the two, is to reduce relation to an absolute.
lation is distinct froIn any and every absolute. 46
tutes a distinct category of being, 47
a pure reference to a term. 48

But re-

It consti-

whose whole essence is

Nor can predicamental relations

ever be hypostatized so as to exist in themselves. 49

By their

act of existence they inhere immediately in a subject, modify
that subject, relate it to something else. 50

Nor, as Suarez

pointed out, as relations can never exist in themselves separated from their proximate subject of inherence, can they ever be
~

/

~

44 Andre Marc, S.J., L'Idee de l'etre, Gabriel Beauchesne et ses
Fils, Paris, 1933, lOl-lO~
45 Etienne Gilson, On Essence and Existence, lecture 12, from
short-hand notes-raken during an unpublished series of lectures given at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies,
Toronoo, from March 8, 1946 to April 25, 1946.
46 ~UOdl., IX, 4.
47n V Meta., lect. 9, n. 889-894.
48
T:, I, q. 28, a. 1.
49 Suarez, d. 47, s. 5, n. 12.
50 C. G., IV, c. 14.
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the proper effect of any .efficiency. 51
of itself an absolute, 52
solute. 53

As every principle is

•

so every cause is of itself an ab-

As every cause is of itself an absolute, so every

proper effect is of itself an absolute. 54

But when the agent'

causality terminates at an effect, if the proper conditions are
had, a relation will result. 55

Although there are many diffi-

culties arising out of this notion of resultancy, !esultantia,56
a thousand difficulties do not make a doubt.

Resultancy is ad-

mitted by all the scholastics in the case of the origin of quantity and quality from a substance. 57
Thus, in brief, the Suarezian position on predicamental relation, focused on the rational distinction between relation
and foundation, seems to destroy both the reality and the relativity of the relations.

But in closing our brief study of

Suarez's position on this question, we can add a word of qualified commendation.

Throughout his distinction of relation,

Suarez was manfully combating the radical Nominalism of his
day by insisting on the extra-mental reality of relations.
fact he admitted and asserted with brilliant vigour.

This

If his

explanation of this fact seems in the last analysis incorrect
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

trz

Suarez, d. 47, s. 6, n. 1.
S. T., I, q. 41, a. 5.
Ibid., I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 1.
Ibid., I, q. 43, a. 3.
John of st. Thomas, I, 595 a 20.
Ibid., 590-595.
Ibid., I, 461 a 30.
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and even inconsistent with his initial premise of the reality

..

of relations, let us not condemn him too harshly or too hastily.
Let us remember that even now, centuries later, scholastics,
and even Thomists, are still quite divided in their interpretation of the intimate nature of this most elusive of beings.
But Suarez's final position fails to do justice to the evidence
as we see it.
relations;

His intentions were correct:

to justify real

his explanation, however, seems to destroy the very

thing he set out to justify.

As we see the problem, the only

way to explain real relations, to keep them real and to keep
them relations; to keep them a distinct predicament, is to
place a real distinction between the relation and its foundation.

..
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